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I. INTRODUCTION

The scene was familiar. Dad was drunk again. He stormed into the
apartment, grabbed twelve-year-old Andrew and threw him against the wall,
railing at him for driving the boy's mother away six years ago. This time a
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neighbor called the police, and the next morning Andrew woke up in a
group home for boys. When he made a dash for the front door, a counselor
grabbed him, and Andrew shoved back. Again the police came. This time
they carted Andrew off to juvenile detention. When Andrew appeared
before the judge the following day, she asked him if he wanted a lawyer.
Andrew did not know, so he turned to the caseworker and asked him. The
caseworker said he had a right to a lawyer, but he did not need one, not
here injuvenile court, not on a simple assault charge. Andrewtold thejudge
"no" and admitted the charge of assault. After a cursory plea colloquy, the
judge adjudicated Andrew "delinquent." With that ruling, Andrew faced the
prospect of spending the next six years of his life in ajuvenile institution,
with no further hearing or charge of misconduct.1
In another courtroom, sixteen-year-old Thomas stood before ajuvenile
court judge for the first time in his life, more scared than he had ever been
on the streets. Thomas was no angel, but it had not crossed his mind that
he could land in court when he and his best friend Joey had set out to boost
a car the night before. Thomas could not let Joey go down by himself, even
though Thomas had given up and gone home before they found a car they
wanted to take. He felt bad about going along with Joey in the first place,
so when the judge asked if he wanted a lawyer, he said "no" and admitted
the charges. Thomas served his year long probation without a hitch. When
he turned eighteen, Thomas decided to follow in the footsteps of his older
brother and enlist in the Army. The rejection letter stated simply, "felony
record." Thomas was hurt and angry. Why hadn't anyone told him about
this when he was in juvenile court two years ago?2
One would like to think that Andrew's and Thomas's stories are
anomalies, but they are not. In juvenile courts across the country, children
routinely give up their right to counsel without being given any explanation
ofwhat the right means or why they might choose to exercise it. As a result,
these children unwittingly forego their right to have a lawyer represent them
and, in so doing, expose themselves to the possibility of incarceration for
the remainder of their youth, which may amount to many years, and to the
loss of other opportunities later in life.3 Meanwhile, federal and state laws
declare that the same children lack the legal capacity to enter into a

1. "Andrew" is a fictional character. His story is based on the experience of a child who
became a client ofthe Juvenile Justice Clinic at the William S. Boyd School of Law (Boyd) shortly
after the events described here.
2. "Thomas" also is fictional. His story is based on the experience of a family member of
a student in the Boyd Juvenile Justice Clinic. See infra notes 446-71 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the collateral consequences of a delinquency adjudication, including exclusion

from the military.
3. See infra note 467 and accompanying text for a discussion of, inter alia, the limitations
on educational and employment opportunities that can result from a delinquency adjudication.
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contract, commit a tort, own property, marry, vote, or serve on ajury The
stated rationale for these laws and the legal disabilities they impose on
children is that they are for the children's own protection. Yet our laws
often do not protect a child from waiver of right to counsel even though
that waiver imperils the child's constitutionally protected rights.5
Studies report that more than one-half of children accused of criminal
acts appear in juvenile court without counsel and enter pleas to crimes they
may or may not have committed.' Those data are particularly disturbing in
light of the long-standing recognition by the United States Supreme Court7
and legal scholars8 that the right to counsel is fundamental to the exercise
of other procedural rights by those accused of criminal acts. As early as
1932, the Court stated that without the "guiding hand of counsel," an
accused's "right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail." 9
Without counsel, the accused's right to remain silent, to confront and crossexamine his accusers, and to have the state prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt are all in jeopardy.'°
The reasons for the absence of counsel in juvenile cases are not entirely
clear. Commentators have raised such possible explanations as parental

4. MARTIN R. GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE LAW 91-120 (1997) (discussing the
comprehensive treatment of laws limiting and protecting juveniles); see also Willey v. Hudspeth,
178 P.2d 246 (Kan. 1947). In Willey, the judge overturned a seventeen-year-old's waiver of
counsel and cited a litany of legal disabilities that protected the defendant. Id. at 521, 524. He
could not have entered into a valid contract obligating himself, he could not have voted, and he
could not have married without the consent of his parents; he could not alone, without a guardian
or next friend, have said anything in a courtroom in a civil action which would be binding upon
him. Id. at 521. The court then asked, "Should we say, in such circumstances, that about the only
thing he could have done alone, with legal significance, was to have pleaded guilty to a felony in
a court of law?" Id.
5. Barry C. Feld, Criminalizingthe American Juvenile Court,in 17 CRIME AND JUSTICE;

A REVIEW

OF RESEARCH

197, 223 (Michael Tonry ed., 1993).

6. Barry C. Feld, In re Gault Revisited: A Cross-State Comparisonof the Right to Counsel
in Juvenile Court,34 CRIME & DELINQ. 393, 406 (1988). Studies have shown thatjuveniles were
represented in a "lower percentage of cases than were children in abuse and neglect
[proceedings]," despite the ruling in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), that juveniles charged with
delinquent (criminal) acts have a protected constitutional right to counsel. Robert E. Shepherd,
Jr. & Sharon S. England, "IKnow the ChildIs My Client, But Who Am I?," 64 FORDHAM L. REV.

1917, 1930 (1996) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL STUDY OF
GUARDIAN AD LITEM REPRESENTATION 11-14 (1990)).
7. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 352 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65
(1932).
8. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A
Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right of an Accused," 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1962).
9. Powell, 287 U.S. at 64, 69.
10. Gault, 387 U.S. at 41; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 368 (1970) (stating that due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile
delinquency proceedings).
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reluctance to retain counsel, judicial ambivalence or even hostility to
advocacy in the more treatment-oriented juvenile courts, and inadequate
public defender services." The most common explanation for the high
number of unrepresented children, however, is that they waived their right
to counsel at an early stage in the proceedings." Reasons suggested for the
high incidence of waiver by juveniles center on juvenile court judges and
includejudicial encouragement of waiver to ease the administrative burden
on the court, cursory judicial advisories of rights that do not convey the
importance of legal counsel, and judicial predetermination that counsel is
not needed because probation is the anticipated outcome.13 This culture of
waiver prevails injuvenile courts in manyjurisdictions, despite the singular
importance of the "guiding hand of counsel" and social-psychological
studies showing that most children are developmentally incapable of
exercising a valid waiver.'
Although a number of juvenile justice advocates and scholars have
decried the prevalence ofjuvenile waiver of right to counsel, 5 no one has
undertaken a comprehensive study ofthe problem. This Article attempts to
fill that gap. The Article begins with a review of the historical context in
which juvenile right to counsel arose and proceeds to a discussion of the
landmark In re Gault 6 decision and the due process underpinnings of
juvenile right to counsel. The Article then chronicles the long-standing
practice of permitting juveniles to waive their right to counsel and shows
that the vast majority of nearly one hundred post-Gaultwaiver of counsel
cases were overturned on appeal, and those that were upheld are largely
indistinguishable from those that were overturned. The ninety-nine collected
cases may well be just the tip of the iceberg because of the low appeal rate
injuvenile cases,' 7 but nineteen states are represented, and both Florida and

11. DOUGLAS C. DODGE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DUE
PROCESS ADVOCACY, FACT SHEET NO. 49 (1997); see also Feld, supra note 5, at 223.
12. PATRICIA PURITZ E" AL., A.B.A., A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO
COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 7-8 (1995) (making

the point that under-representation is attributable, in large part, to waiver, and that "[w]aivers of
counsel by young people are sometimes induced by suggestions that lawyers are not needed
because no serious dispositional consequences are anticipated"); see also Tory J. Caeti et al.,
Juvenile Right to Counsel: A NationalComparison ofState Legal Codes, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 611,
617-18 (1996); Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth andPublic Policy: A CaseStudy ofJuvenile Justice
Lmv Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1111 (1995).
13. Feld, supra note 5, at 223.
14. See infra notes 332-67.
15. See generallyDODGE, supra note 11; PURITZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 15; Caeti et al.,
supra note 12; Feld, supra note 12.

16. 387 U.S. 1(1967).
17. See infra notes 376-79 and accompanying text. For example, based on the personal
experience of the author, few appeals are taken in juvenile cases in Nevada, and no Nevada cases
are among those reported here.
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Ohio report over twenty cases overturning waivers in the juvenile court. 8
The Article next examines the work ofdevelopmental psychologists, which
reveals that juveniles as a class have limited decisionmaking abilities, lack
an adequate understanding oftheir legal rights, and as a result are incapable
of exercising an effective waiver. The Article concludes that permitting
juveniles to waive their right to counsel constitutes a denial of that right
and, accordingly, that due process prohibits juvenile courts from accepting
waivers of counsel by juveniles against whom delinquency petitions have
been filed.
II.

THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE RIGHTS

The case of fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault reached the United States
Supreme Court in 1967, nearly seventy years after the creation of the
juvenile court system. 9 Although an able lawyer represented young Gault
at the high court, no lawyer had appeared at his side as he stood accused of
criminal conduct in an Arizonajuvenile court.2" Nor had Gault received the
protection of any of the other procedural safeguards available to adult
21
defendants appearing in criminal courtrooms in the same courthouse.
Gault was accused of a crime which put him injeopardy of incarceration for
the next six years of his life, but he had no rights. To understand how this
Kafkaesque scene could exist in late twentieth century America requires an
understanding of the history of the juvenile justice system in this country
and the competing currents of humanitarianism and social control within
that system.
A. Juvenile Delinquency and the ProgressiveMovement
The concept ofjuvenile delinquency dates to the seventeenth century,
when it "arose in the wake of economic and political conditions endemic to
nascent capitalist societies" in Europe. 2 It was not until the late 1800s,
however, that an effort was made to create a "coherent system ofjuvenile
justice" out of the reforms of the previous two centuries.23 The birth of the
late nineteenth century era of juvenile justice was driven by the massive
industrialization and relentless influx of immigrants that gripped the nation's

18. See infra Appendices A & B.
19. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
20. See id. at 5-8.
21. Id.
22. ANTHONY M. PLAIT, THE CHILD SAVERS xviii (2d ed., 1977) (quoting Herman
Schwendinger & Julia R. Schwendinger, Delinquency and the Collective Varieties of Youth, 5
CRIME & SOC. JUST. 11 (1976)).
23. Id. at xviii (emphasis in original).
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largest metropolitan areas at that time.24 Concerns that "social cleavages
' spawned the
were becoming so deep that they threatened social stability"25
Progressive Movement, out ofwhich thejuvenilejustice system emerged.26
Progressive reformers tackled the full panoply of social problems
generated by industrialization and modernization, from economic regulation
to political reform and criminal justice.27 Those who took up the cause of
systematic juvenile justice reform became known as the "child savers.' 28
The child savers viewed themselves as "altruists and humanitarians
dedicated to rescuing those who were less fortunately placed in the social

' History has generally perpetuated the humanitarian image of the
order."29

child savers,3" emphasizing the "noble sentiments and tireless energy of
middle-class philanthropists."'" Some historians, however, have seen the
motivations of the child savers as a bit more complex. Anthony Platt, for
example, observed that the impetus for the child-saving movement "came
primarily from the middle and upper classes, who were instrumental in

24.

ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT 6-7

(1978). Juvenile court historian Ellen Ryerson has written that "it was not the sheer size of cities
which was alarming; it was also the proportion of their populations which was poor and foreign."
Id. at 6. The immigrants during the late 1800s and early 1900s were "more alien in their origins
and eventually more threatening in their numbers than the United States had ever encountered."
Id.at 6-7. While earlier immigrants had come largely from northern Europe, the percentage of the
entering population arriving from southern and eastern Europe amounted to almost twenty percent
in the 1880s, rose to fifty-two percent in the 1890s, and to seventy-four percent between 1901 and
1910. Id at 7.
25. Id. at 9.
26. PLATT, supranote 22, at xix. Plattdescribes the Progressive Movement as a "movement
designed to rescue and regulate capitalism through developing a new political economy, designed
on the one hand to stabilize production and fiscal planning, and on the other to co-opt the rising
wave of popular militancy" reflected in the growing demands of the working class for changes in
social and economic conditions. Id
27. See generally VICTORIA GRETIS, THE JUVENILE COURT AND THE PROGRESSIVES 9-27
(2000).
28. As defined by Anthony Platt, the term "child savers" is used to "characterize a group of
'disinterested' reformers who regarded their cause as a matter of conscience and morality, serving
no particular class or political interests." PLATT, supra note 22, at 3.
29. Id
30. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, JUVENILE JUSTICE: A CENTURY OF CHANGE (1999); JOHN C. WATKINS, JR., THE
JUVENILEJUSTICECENTURY:ASOCiOLEGALCOMMENTARYONAMvERICANJUVENILECOURTS27-28

(1998); Charles L. Chute, Fifty Years of the Juvenile Court,NAT'L PROB. & PAROLEASS'NY.B.
1 (1949); Charles L. Chute, The Juvenile Court in Retrospect, FED. PROBATION 13 (Sept. 1949);
Harrison A. Dobbs, In Defense ofJuvenile Courts, FED. PROBATION 29 (Sept. 1949); Bobby Scott
et al., Juvenile Justice: Reform After One-HundredYears, 37 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 1409 (1999).
31. PLATT, supra note 22, at 10.
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devising new forms of social control to protect theirpower and privilege.
Platt stated, further:

32

While the child savers justified their reforms as humanitarian,
it is clear that this humanitarianism reflected their class
background and elitist conceptions of human potentiality. The
child savers shared the view of more conservative
professionals that "criminals" were a distinct and dangerous
class, indigenous to working-class culture, and a threat to
"civilized" society.33
As a consequence, child savers were often "anti-immigrant, distrustful of
the poor, and willing to impose their own cultural standards on others. 34
Platt' s view, however, does not account for or diminish the significance
of the work of such progressive child savers as Jane Adams, Lucy Flower,
and Julia Lathrop, who primarily were concerned with diverting children
from the adult criminal justice system. 35 The objective of protecting young
delinquents from the destructive and punitive nature of the criminal justice
system was the primary motivator for those who first recognized juvenile
delinquency and began to conceptualize the juvenile court.36 Illinois Juvenile
Court Judge Richard Tuthill would later remark:
No matter how young these children were indicted,
prosecuted, and confined, as criminals, just the same as were
adults pending and after a hearing, and thus were branded as
criminals before they knew what crime was. The State kept
these little ones in police cells and jails among the worst men
and women to be found in the vilest parts of the city and town.
Under such treatment they developed rapidly, and the natural
result was that they were thus educated in crime and when
discharged were well fitted to become the expert criminals and
32. Id. at xx. Platt is quick to point out that the reforms brought about by the child-saving
movement were "not achieved without conflict within the ruling class" and represented "a victory
for the more 'enlightened' wing of corporate leaders who advocated strategic alliances with urban
reformers and supported liberal reforms." Id.
33. Id. at xxvii-xxviii.
34. GRETIS, supra note 27, at 13.
35. Franklin E. Zimring, The Common Thread: Diversion in Juvenile Practice,88 CAL. L.
REV. 2477,2484(2000). Zimring notes, too, the impetus of the child-savers' belief in the positive
good that ajustice system focused on the social welfare and needs of the child could bring. Id. at
2482-83. Zimring contends that late twentieth century accounts of the juvenile court, which have
emphasized this "interventionist"justification for a separate juvenile justice system, have had the
unfortunate consequences of underestimating the paramount importance to the system's founders
of avoiding criminal treatment of children and confounding our present understanding of the
developing nature ofjuvenile justice throughout the twentieth century. Id. at 2484.
36. Id. at 2482-84.
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outlaws who have crowded our penitentiaries and jails. The
State had educated innocent children in crime, and the harvest
was great.37
Central to achieving the diversion of juvenile delinquents from the
criminal justice system were the Progressives' trust in the State as a
benevolent being that could be the principal agent for social change and
their faith in the ability of science to solve social problems. 3 The
Progressives' unequivocal trust of state-instituted social control, coupled
with a new conception of children as dependent beings, not just small
adults, led to protective laws regulating child labor, child welfare, and
compulsory education.39 Progressive reformers' faith in science caused them
to challenge the traditional view of crime as a product ofthe free will of bad
actors and to turn to the social sciences to identify the underlying causes of
criminal behavior. The maturing science ofpositivist criminology, which the
Progressives embraced, moved away from treating the accused as morally
responsible individuals capable of exercising their own free will and instead
began attributing criminal conduct to forces external to and beyond the
control of the individual accused-biological, psychological, sociological,
and environmental influences.40 Adherents of positivist criminology
advocated a system of "individualized justice" in which the personal and
social background of the offender became highly relevant, and punishment
and deterrence assumed little relevance.4 This approach reflected a new
"rehabilitative ideal" founded onthe reformers' beliefin the ability ofhuman
beings to change for the better.42
B. The Creation of the Juvenile Court
Juvenile court is a direct outgrowth of the Progressives' protective and
rehabilitative ideals. The creation of the court "marked the height of
confidence in the possibility of reclaiming delinquents for an orderly and

37. Id. at 2482, quoting Richard S. Tuthill, History of the Children'sCourt in Chicago, in
CHILDREN'S COURTS IN THE U.S.: THEIR ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT, AND RESULTS 1,

1 (Richard H.

Ward & Austin Flowers eds., 1973) (1904).

38. Id. at 9-27.
39. Barry C. Feld, CriminalizingJuvenile Justice: Rules of Procedurefor the Juvenile
Court,69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 145-46 (1984).
40. DAVID E. GARLAND,PUNISHMENT AND WELFARE: A HISTORY OF PENAL STRATEGIES 87
DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 298 (1980); see also CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, THE
SUPREME COURT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 26(1998).
41. MANFREDI, supra note 40, at 26.

(1985);

42. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1986); see also Barry
C. Feld, The Transformationofthe Juvenile Court-Part11:Race andthe "CrackDown" on Youth
Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 335-36 (1999) (hereinafter Transformationfl).
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' Founded in Chicago in 1899, 4 the juvenile court
productive social life."43
combined the new conception ofchildren as vulnerable dependents with the
rehabilitative orientation of the child savers to create a "judicial-welfare
alternative to criminal justice. 45 Until then, the judicial system had treated
juveniles much the same as adult offenders. 4' The concept of mens
rea-that criminal responsibility can attach only to those capable of
knowing right from wrong-had provided the only legal defense at common
law for youthful offenders. 47 The common law infancy doctrine presumed
that children under the age of seven lacked the capacity to form criminal
intent, treated children fourteen and older as fully responsible adults, and
created a rebuttable presumption that children
between the ages of seven
48
and fourteen lacked criminal capacity.
In the new juvenile court, however, assessing criminal responsibility
became subordinate to assuring the social welfare ofthe accused child. The
49 practice of the
juvenile court replicated the historical parens patriae
courts of chancery in England and the United States to "exercisejurisdiction
for the protection of the unfortunate child"5 ° when the natural parents had
failed in their parental responsibilities. Instead of punishment, children
received treatment through a benign court system whose purpose was to
identify and implement the appropriate intervention strategy to serve the

43. RYERSON, supra note 24, at 14-15.
44. The Cook County Juvenile Court was established pursuant to an 1899 enactment of the
Illinois legislature, entitled An Act to Regulate the TreatmentandControlofDependentNeglected
and Delinquent Children, 1899 ILL. LAWS 131. See DAVID S. TANENHAUS, POLICING THE CHILD:
JUVENILEJUSTICEIN CHICAGO,

1870-1925 (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University

of Chicago) (UMI Dissertation Services copy cataloged in the collection of the Boyd School of
Law Library) (providing a comprehensive treatment of the genesis of the juvenile court system in
Chicago). Some historians dispute Illinois' claim to being the first state to create a special court
for children. In 1874 and 1892 Massachusetts and New York, respectively, enacted laws for trying
juveniles separately from adults; Colorado enacted an educational law in 1899 which, in effect,
created a juvenile court. PLATT, supra note 22, at 9. However, no one challenges Chicago's
primacy in establishing the first comprehensive system ofjuvenile justice. Id. at 10.
45. TransformationII, supranote 42, at 337.
46. BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS 47 (1999).
47. Id.

48. 1

BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

463-64 (George

Sharswood ed., 1871).
49. The doctrine ofparenspatriaewas a creature of the English courts of chancery, whose
focus was not on deviant behavior, but on property matters. Where parents were absent or
otherwise incapable of managing the material affairs of their children, the courts would take over
those responsibilities. Thus, chancery provided a basis for juvenile courts to assert jurisdiction
over children as wards of the court, to protect and provide guidance in lieu of proper parental
support. RYERSON, supra note 24, at 63-77 (critiquing use of parenspatriae to justify authority
ofjuvenile court and keep due process out ofjuvenile court).
50. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court,23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 104 (1909).
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"child's 'best interests.'' Because Progressives saw the consequences
children faced as so benign, they believed that the procedural protections
accorded adult criminal defendants were unnecessary. 2 By 1925, all states
except Maine and Wyoming, and more than twenty other nations, including
Lenin's Russia, had established juvenile courts. 3
Support for an informal, treatment-oriented approach to juvenile crime,
however, was not universal. The doctrine ofparenspatriaerecognized only
the child's right to custody, not her right to liberty and, as such, elevated
social control over humanitarianism as the operative principle ofjuvenile
justice. 4 One of the earliest critics of the juvenile court, Edward Lindsey,
observed in 1914 that in the juvenile court system, "[tihere is often a very
real deprivation of liberty, nor is that fact changed by refusing to call it
punishment or because the good of the child is stated to be the object."55
Lindsey and others doubted the wisdom of a system that gave sweeping
custodial powers to juvenile court judges, unchecked by any counterbalancing rights of children: 6 Those critics' concerns were not surprising,
given that "the founding principles ofjuvenile courts 'made the personality
of the judge, his likes and dislikes, attitudes and prejudices, consistencies
and caprices,57 the decisive element in shaping the character of his
courtroom.'

Moreover, the Progressives' rhetoric did not always match reality.
Thirty years after the birth ofthe juvenile court, conditions in mostjuvenile
institutions were no more conducive to treatment and positive change than

51.
52.
53.
54.

TransformationII, supra note 42, at 337.
Id.
TANENHAUS, supra note 44, at 6.
See HARJIT S. SANDHU & C. WAYNE HEASLEY, IMPROVING JUVENILE JUSTICE: POWER

ADVOCACY, DIVERSION, DECRIMINALIZATION, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, AND DUE PROCESS
JUSTICE 56 (1981).
55. Edward Lindsey, The Juvenile Court Movement From a Lawyer's Standpoint,ANNALS

AMER. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 145 (1914).
56. FELD, supra note 46, at 7. Juvenile court judges had expansive powers. They could
freely decide to leave children with their parents or other caregivers, put them on probation under
the supervision of a probation officer, place them in a suitable family home, or send them to an
institution, all without constraint or oversight. Id. at 70 (citing JOSEPH HAWES, CHILDREN IN
URBAN SOCEITY: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1971)). They
imposed indeterminate and nonproportional dispositions, subjectively and without limits. See id.;
see also ROTHMAN, supra note 40, at 268.
57. MANFREDI, supra note 40, at 32 (quoting DAVID ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE
ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER INTHENEW REPUBLIC 238 (1971)). A German professor
who came to the United States in the early 1900s to study the American juvenile justice system
observed of proceedings in Judge Julian Mack's court in Chicago, "'They have colossal powers,
your judges, colossal!' TANENHAUS, supra note 44, at 179 (quoting Henry K. Webster, The
Square Deal with Children,AMER. ILLUSTRATED MAG. 394, 401 (Feb. 1906).
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their adult counterparts.58 As one critic observed, "[t]he closer the scrutiny
of juvenile confinement, the more inadequate and, indeed, punitive, the
programs turned out to be."59 By the mid to late 1930s, prominent critics
had become outspoken. Dean Roscoe Pound minced no words when he
wrote in 1937 that "[t]he powers of the Star Chamber were a trifle in
comparison with those ofourjuvenile courts."60 Even so, it took three more
decades and the "Due Process Revolution" of the Warren Court to bring
about any semblance of change.
C. The Seeds of Change
The 1964 annual meeting of the National Council of Juvenile Court
Judges marked a watershed in the attitude of the United States Supreme
Court toward juvenile justice. Chief Justice Earl Warren announced to a
"dismayed audience ofjuvenile courtjudges still attached toparenspatriae
ideals" that change was afoot in the juvenile justice arena. 6' He made the
bold statement that juvenile courts, like adult criminal courts, "'must
function within the framework of law' and provide juveniles with due
process protection against capricious decisionmaking." 2 Although the Chief
Justice did not elaborate the specific elements ofdue process to be accorded
juveniles, he expressed the Court's willingness to undertake to define those
elements when the "proper cases" came before it.63 To the new breed of
reformers who had become disenchanted with the increasingly punitive
nature of the juvenile courts and the unrestrained discretion of juvenile
courtjudges, Chief Justice Warren's statement was a welcome invitation.'
The first case to reach the Supreme Court in response to that invitation
was Kent v. United States. 65 The issue in Kent was whether the sixteen-

58. ROTHMAN, supranote 40, at 268. Rothman used the term "conscience and convenience!
to describe the judicial decision whether to assign a delinquent youth to probation or commit him
to a secure institution. See generally id.
59. Id. at 268.
60.

ROSCOE POUND, Foreword, in YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND

DELINQUENCY, xxvii (1937), quoted in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967); see also Holmes
Appeal, 109 A.2d 523, 528 (Pa. 1954) (Musmanno, J.;dissenting) (stating that what a child
charged with a crime needs is "justice not... parenspatriae").
61. MANFREDI, supra note 40, at 52.

62. Id. (quoting Earl Warren, EqualJusticefor Juveniles, 15 Juv. CT. JUDGES J.14 (1964)).
Earlier enactments in some states reflected the growing concern that due process enter thejuvenile
courts. See David R. Barrett et al., Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and
IndividualizedJustice, 79 HARV. L. REv. 775, 790-91 (1966), citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§ 633, 634, 659, 700 (Supp. 1964) (requirement of counsel as part of 1961 Act); N.Y. FAMILY
CT. ACT §§ 241-249, 741 (institution of law guardian system in New York) (1998).
63. MANFREDI, supranote 40, at 52.
64. See id.
65. 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966).
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year-old defendant was entitled to a hearing at which he was represented by
counsel prior to thejuvenile court's waiver of its exclusive jurisdiction and
transfer of his case to adult criminal court." The statutory procedure at the
time permitted the court to waive jurisdiction after "full investigation" in
any case in which a child over sixteen years of age was charged with an
offense that would amount to a felony in an adult case.67 The Supreme
Court surveyed the evidence regarding Morris Kent and other youthful
offenders in similar cases and found "grounds for concern that the child
receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children." 8 The Court refused to condone such inequities.69
The Court acknowledged that the transfer statute gave the juvenile court
considerable latitude, but stated, that "latitude is not complete. At the
outset, it assumes procedural regularity sufficient... to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process and fairness .... It does not confer upon the
Juvenile Court a license for arbitrary procedure."7'
The Court ruled that the applicable statute, read in the context of due
process and right to counsel, required a hearing at which Morris Kent was
entitled to be represented by a lawyer who had access to the social records
and other reports considered by the court.7 However, the Court stopped
short of granting young Kent's request to rule that the constitutional
guarantees applicable to adults charged with the same offenses must apply
injuvenile court proceedings.' The failure of Kent to decide those broader
issues set the stage for the Court's landmark Gaultdecision the following
year.
D. Due Process in the Juvenile Court
Gerald Gault was fifteen when he was adjudicated delinquent for making
obscene telephone calls to a female neighbor.' The Arizona law that Gault
had violated was a misdemeanor for which the criminal penalty applicable
to an adult was a fine of from $5 to $50 or imprisonment for not more than
two months.74 The Arizona Juvenile Code, however, gave the juvenile court

66. See generally id.
67. Id. at 547-48.

68. Id. at 556.
69. See id.at 552-53.

70. Id. at 553. The Court further emphasized its condemnation of the juvenile court's
arbitrary procedures when it later stated "the admonition to function in a 'parental' relationship

is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness." Id at 555.
71. Id. at 557.
72. See generally id
73. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4 (1967).
74. Id. at 8-9. The section of the Arizona Criminal Code applicable to Gerald's crime, ARIz.
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broad discretion in assessing the appropriate disposition.' The juvenile
court judge took full advantage of this discretion and, after a summary
hearing, committed Gault to the State Industrial School "for the period of
his minority [that is, until 21], unless sooner discharged by due process of
law."'7 6 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Gault argued that
the Arizona Juvenile Code was invalid on its face or as applied, because it
permitted a child to be taken from his parents and committed to a state

institution in proceedings in which the court had "virtually unlimited
discretion."77
The Supreme Court agreed and thus launched what it termed the
"constitutional domestication" of the juvenile court system.7" Writing for
the majority, Justice Abe Fortas declared that "neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill ofRights is for adults alone."79 The Court held that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that
children charged with criminal acts enjoy several procedural protections: the
right to notice of the charges against them,8" the right to counsel to assist
in their defense, 8 the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against them, 2 and the privilege against self-incrimination.

REv. STAT. § 13-377 (1956), provided that a person who "in the presence or hearing of any
woman or child ...uses vulgar, abusive or obscene language, is guilty of a misdemeanor." Id.
at 8.
75. See id. at 10.
76. See id.at 7-8 (quotation marks omitted).
77. Id. at 10.
78. See id.at 22 ("the features ofthejuvenile system which its proponents have asserted are
of unique benefit will not be impaired by constitutional domestication").
79. Id at 13.
80. Id. at 33-34 (discussing notice of charges).
81. Id.at 41 (discussing the right to counsel).
82. Id. at 57 (discussing the right to confrontation and cross-examination). The Court did
not find a due process violation in the Juvenile Code's failure to provide a transcript and a
mechanism for appeal. Id. at 58. However, based on the burdens imposed on the habeas process
by the absence of those mechanisms, the Court urged the Arizona Supreme Court to take
appropriate actions. Id.
83. Id.at 55. The Court treated the privilege against self-incrimination differently from the
other rights, ruling that the Fifth Amendment privilege, made applicable to the states by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, extended to children in juvenile court proceedings
as well as to adults. Id. While the Court could have similarly incorporated the Sixth Amendment
rights to notice of charges, counsel, and confrontation and cross-examination into the Due Process
Clause, it did not, for reasons which the Court did not articulate. See generally id. Justice Harlan
dissented from the Fifth Amendment portion of the majority opinion. Id. 66-78 (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). His view was that the Court should have limited its
ruling to those restrictions which would "later permit the orderly selection of any additional
protections." Id.at 72 (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). That approach would
permit the Court to "guarantee the fundamental fairness of the proceeding, and yet permit the
States to continue development of an effective response to the problems of juvenile crime." Id.
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The Court criticized theparenspatriaeapproach ofthejuvenile courts,
decrying its meaning as "murky"" and finding the constitutional basis "for
this peculiar system.., to say the least-debatable." 5 The Court was
particularly troubled by the breadth ofjuvenile court judges' discretion-a
discretion so broad that a child could lose six years ofhis freedom for an act
86
which would have cost an adult no more than two months in restraint.
After reviewing the history of the juvenile court, the Supreme Court
concluded that "j]uvenile court history has again demonstrated that
unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor
substitute for principle and procedure."87 The remedy for the individual
unfairness and unfortunate dispositions so common in juvenile courts, the
Supreme Court concluded, was "the procedural
regularity and the exercise
' 88
of care implied in the phrase 'due process."'
The Gault Court's reliance on fundamental fairness 9 embodied in due
process as the touchstone for the constitutional rights it recognized9 was

(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Harlan criticized the majority,
asserting that it had "asked the wrong questions: the problem here is to determine what forms of
procedural protection are necessary to guarantee the fundamental fairness ofjuvenile proceedings,
and not which of the procedures now employed in criminal trials should be transplanted intact to
proceedings in these specialized courts." Id at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
84. Id. at 16.
85. Id at 17.
86. See id. at 29-30.
87. Id at 18.
88. Id. at 27-28. Gault was not the first case to recognize juveniles' right to counsel as a
matter of due process. In a 1948 decision concerning a juvenile being tried in adult court, the
Supreme Court said that such incapacities as youth or ignorance would require appointment of
counsel under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S.
672, 683 (1948). See infranotes 166-69 and accompanying text.
89. The Gaultmajority did not use the term "fundamental fairness,"although both Justice
Black and Justice Harlan articulated it to characterize the majority's constitutional standard.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 61-62 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 72 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). In addition, subsequent decisions of the Court characterized Gault in that
manner, beginning with McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971). See also Schall v.
Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 531 (1975). "Fundamental
fairness" was not a newly coined term; Supreme Court decisions had used it for decades to define
both those individual rights that are to be deemed "fundamental" and the procedures to be applied
in addressing those rights. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67-73 (1932) (basing
recognition of right to appointed counsel on fundamental fairness and due process and limiting
right to cases involving situations similar to those in the case before it, the famous "Scottsboro
Boys" capital case).
90. Although the GaultCourt relied on the due process concept of fundamental fairness as
the principal constitutional framework for its recognition of juveniles' rights in delinquency
proceedings, it refused to be constrained by it. In determining whether the privilege against selfincrimination was available in juvenile court proceedings, it was not the danger of unreliability
of juvenile confessions, a fairness concern, that impelled the Court's conclusion. Instead, the
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significant because it focused the inquiry on the process of juvenile
adjudication and the protections necessary to make that process fair, not on
whether juveniles' rights should mirror those of adult defendants.9 The
fundamental fairness doctrine permitted the Court to stake out a middle
ground that abandoned the former "worst of both worlds" juvenile court
regime in which children received neither the constitutional protections
afforded adult defendants nor the care and treatment that justified the
absence of those protections.92 At the same time, the Court ushered in a
new system that would accommodate both.

Court said, the
roots of the privilege are... far deeper. They tap the basic stream of religious
and political principle because the privilege reflects the limits of the individual's
attornment to the state and-in a philosophical sense-insists upon the equality
of the individual and the state. In other words, the privilege has a broader and
deeper thrust than the rule which prevents the use of confessions which are the
product of coercion because coercion is thought to carry with it the danger of
unreliability.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 47. Thus, the proper protection against the evils of self-incrimination was the
specific protection of the Fifth Amendment, as made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, id., not the fundamental fairness analysis by which the other Gault rights
were discerned.
91. The Justices were not of one mind in adopting the fundamental fairness analysis for
juvenile due process. Justice Black argued in his concurring opinion that the majority should have
relied on the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment by the
Due Process Clause, not on the independent "fundamental fairness" doctrine of due process. Id.
at 61 (Black, J., concurring). He believed that juveniles' constitutional rights are no different than
adults and that those rights "are specifically granted by ... the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
which the Fourteenth Amendment makes applicable to the States." Id. (Black, J., concurring).
Black's concurrence was consistent with his view that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments encompass no further rights than those stated in the Bill of Rights, but
are limited to assuring enforcement ofthe "law of the land," which he defined as any duly enacted
legislation, unless the particular law is otherwise unconstitutional. E.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358,377-78 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that due process does not require proof beyond
a reasonable doubt in juvenile delinquency proceedings). Justice Black reflects the thinking of the
legal positivists, who treat the delineation of specific rights in the Bill of Rights as proof that the
framers intended protection of those rights, and those rights alone. See Martin H. Redish &
Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values ofProceduralDue Process,
95 YALE L.J. 455, 464 (1986). Redish and Marshall criticize the positivists and cite as support for
their critique James Madison's caution that "[n]o language is so copious as to supply words and
phrases for every complex idea." Id. at 464 n.38. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 37 at 236 (J.
Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1977)). The authors state, further, that it is not unreasonable "to suggest
that, notwithstanding the Bill of Rights' enumeration of specific procedures, the framers fashioned
an open-ended clause to cover both those procedures that they might have accidently omitted and
those that might prove necessary in future times." Id. at 464.
92. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 547-48 (1966); see also supra notes 65-72 and
accompanying text.
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The Court found in the fundamental fairness guarantee the
"jurisprudential basis for affording the essential protections of the adult
criminal process while preserving the rehabilitative goals, confidentiality,
and other benevolent features of the juvenile court process."93 While
recognizing that due process requires a procedural regularity then lacking
in juvenile court proceedings, the Gault Court reassured skeptics that it
does not "require that the conception of the kindly juvenile judge be
replaced by its opposite."94 Nor would any of the due process protections
mandated by the Court undermine the beneficial qualities ofjuvenile court
proceedings." The Court made clear, however, that juveniles' due process
rights would 6no longer be sacrificed to parenspatriaenotions of judicial
beneficence.
In the years following Gault, the Court continued to define juveniles'
due process rights.9" Three years after Gault, the Court issued two
decisions that refined the meaning of fundamental fairness in juvenile
proceedings. In the first case, In re Winship,98 the Court held that due
process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt for juvenile defendants
as well as for adults.99 The Court explained the historical grounding of the
reasonable doubt standard as a common law tradition "developed to
safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting
forfeitures of life, liberty and property."'" The Court reasoned thatparens
patriaeintervention may be desirable for dealing with wayward youths, but
that such "intervention cannot take the form of subjecting the child to the
stigma of a finding that he violated a criminal law and to the possibility of
institutional confinement on proof insufficient to convict him were he an
adult."'' The reasonable doubt standard, the Court said, safeguards the

93. Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice:
Ensuringthe FairnessofJuvenile DelinquencyTrials,33 WAKEFORESTL. REv. 553,558 (1998).
94. Gault, 387 U.S. at 27-28; see also id. at 21 ("the observance of due process standards,
intelligently and not ruthlessly administered, will not compel the States to abandon or displace
any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process"); id. at 22 ("the features of the juvenile
system which its proponents have asserted are of unique benefit will not be impaired by
constitutional domestication. For example, the commendable principles relating to the processing
and treatment of juveniles separately from adults are in no way involved or affected by the
procedural issues under discussion"); id. at 25 ("there is no reason why, consistently with due
process, a State cannot continue, if it deems it appropriate, to provide and to improve provision
for the confidentiality of records of police contacts and court action relating to juveniles").
95. Id. at 25.
96. Id. at 17-19.
97. See generallyIn re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528 (1970).
98. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
99. Id. at362.
100. Id.
101. Id. at367.
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accused by "reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error," and
thus promotes a fundamentally fair trial process."2 However, just a few
months after Winship, the Court used the same analysis to reject ajuvenile's
demand for a jury trial.
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,°3 the Court held that fundamental fairness
does not require jury trials forjuveniles. " The Court ignored Gault'sFifth
Amendment self-incrimination analysis and reasoned simply that trial by jury
is not a "necessary component of accurate factf'mding."' 0 5 The Court cited
Gault's and Winship's reliance on fundamental fairness and its implicit
requirement of accurate factfinding as the applicable due process standard,
and noted that the requirements of notice, counsel, confrontation, crossexamination, and the highest standard of proof "naturally flowed" from an
emphasis on accurate factfinding. "6 That reasoning, however, did not apply
to trial by jury." 7 The Court expressed concern that jury trials would
effectively end the "idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective"
juvenile court proceeding and remake it into a fully adversarial criminal
process.0 8 The Court concluded that affording jury trials in juvenile court
would not contribute positively to the factfinding process engaged in by
judge and jury. 9 Therefore, due process did not require trial by jury in
juvenile court proceedings." 0
The Court later extended another important constitutional right to
juveniles in Breed v. Jones,"' when it held that the double jeopardy bar
contained in the Fifth Amendment applies to delinquency adjudications. , 2
However, two cases in the mid-i 980s, like McKeiver, limited the rights of

102. 1d. at363.
103. 403 U.S. 528 (1970).
104. Id. at 543.
105. Id. McKeiver's reduction of due process to "accurate factfinding" ignores the deeper
individual and societal values represented by fundamental fairness and due process. Of course,
had the Court adopted this broader view of due process, it would have been more difficult to
support its rejection ofjury trials for juveniles.
106. Id. at 543.
107. Id. at 543-45.
108. Id. at 545.
109. Id. at 547.
110. Id. Professors Martin Guggenheim and Randy Hertz challenge the Court's conclusions
as to the inherent fairness ofjudges as factfinders and suggest reforms to improve the adjudicatory
process in juvenile bench trials. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 93, at 582-93. They also note
that McKeiver's appellate counsel did not emphasize the Court's fairness analysis sufficiently,
nor did counsel make clear why trial by jury is indispensable to fairness. Id. at 560.
111. 421 U.S. 519 (1975). Unlike Winship and McKeiver, the Court relied on the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, not on the fundamental fairness principle of the Due Process Clause. Id.at 530, 541.
112. Id. at531.
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juveniles. In Schall v. Martin,'13 the Supreme Court ruled that pretrial
detention does not deprive juveniles of any liberty right," 4 reverting to the
pre-Gault notion that children are always in some form of custody and,
therefore, can be detained for their own good."' The next year, in New
Jersey v. T.L.O.,"' the Court ruled that strict Fourth Amendment
procedures do not apply in schools, thus affording children and adolescents
a lesser right than adults to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures." 7
E. Juvenile Right to Counsel
Although in the years since Gault the Supreme Court has placed
limitations on the rights of juveniles which were not presaged by Gault's
sweeping due process analysis, the Court has not retreated from its
embracing of right to counsel as the cornerstone of due process. Indeed, in
the sole post-Gault decision that addresses right to counsel, Fare v.
Michael C.,"' the Court reinforced the significance of the lawyer, in
contrast to other adult advisers, to the preservation ofjuveniles' rights." 9
First, to Gault.
Gault's rejection ofparenspatriaeis nowhere more profound than in
its ruling that juveniles in delinquency proceedings have a right to counsel.
Until Gault, the Supreme Court had not addressed the question whether
minors facing delinquency charges in juvenile court had the right to
counsel. 20 Given the opportunity, the Court's answer was emphatic and
unequivocal:
We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that in respect of proceedings to
determine delinquency which may result in commitment to an
institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the
child and his parents must be notified of the child's right to be

113. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
114. IdM at 268.
115. Id. at 265.
116. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
117. Id. at341-44.
118. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
119. Id. at719.
120. A year before Gault, the Harvard Law Review published a study that criticized
traditional juvenile court practices and provided empirical support for the legal arguments being
advanced by the court's critics. Barrett et al., supra note 62, at 775-810. The study reported two
astonishing facts: that counsel appeared on behalf ofjuveniles in no more than five percent of the
cases examined and that juvenile court judges actively discouraged juveniles from obtaining
lawyers. Id. (citing Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized
Justice, 79 HARV. L. REv. 775-810 (1966)).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

represented by counsel retained by them, or if they are unable
to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent
the child.'
The Court rejected the Arizona Supreme Court's position that due process
did not require a right to counsel in juvenile proceedings because the
probation officer and judge were fully able to protect the child's interests. '2
The court noted that probation officers' primary responsibilities conflicted
with the duties a lawyer owes a client.' Under Arizona law, the duties of
probation officers included initiating delinquency proceedings by filing and
verifying petitions alleging delinquency, 24 and testifying in court against the
child alleged to be delinquent.'25 Having dispensed with the state's
probation officer argument, the Court then delivered the death blow to
parenspatriae:"Nor can thejudge represent the child. There is no material
difference in this26respect between adult and juvenile proceedings of the sort
here involved."'
The Court relied on the seminal right to counsel cases, Powell v.
Alabama27 and Gideon v. Wainwright, 21 in extending right to counsel to
children in delinquency proceedings.2 9 In Powell, the famous "Scottsboro
Boys" case, the Court ruled that capital defendants are entitled to counsel,
and in so doing emphasized the essential role played by lawyers for the
criminally accused: "The right to be heard would be... of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel."'"3 Powell recognized
the disadvantages faced by pro se defendants and said that
[e]ven the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law.... He lacks both the
skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even

121. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
122. Id. at 35. The Arizona Supreme Court supported its opinion by reference to a provision
of the Arizona Juvenile Code that required the probation officer to "'look after the interests of
neglected, delinquent and dependent children,' including representing their interests in court."
Id. (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. § 8-204(c) (1956)).
123. Id. at 35-36.
124. Id. at 36. Delinquency proceedings are initiated by the filing of a petition alleging
criminal conduct by ajuvenile and asking the court to adjudicate the juvenile "delinquent." See

id.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Gault,387 U.S. at 38-39, 38 n.57.
Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69.
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though he had a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. 3 '
Thirty years later, Gideon repeated Powell's admonition that, without
counsel, defendants cannot receive a fair trial. Ruling that all adult felony
defendants have a right to counsel, Gideon said that "in our adversary
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him." ' The Gideon Court further explained that because ours is an
adversarial system of justice, provision of counsel to the accused is a
fundamental right:
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fundamental and essential.., in some countries, but
it is in ours. From the... beginning, our state and national
constitutions have laid great emphasis on procedural and
substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials .... This
noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with
crime13 3has to face his accusers without [counsel] to assist
him.

In assessing whether the right to counsel applied to juveniles, the Gault
Court employed the same reasoning as had its predecessors in Powell and
Gideon. The Court saw no difference in seriousness between the juvenile
proceeding which subjected Gerald Gault to "the loss of his liberty for
years" and an adult felony prosecution. 134 Thus, like his adult counterparts,
young Gault was entitled to
the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to
make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of
the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and
to prepare and submit it. The child "requires the guiding hand
135
of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him."'

131. Id. at 68-69.
132. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344; see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
Argersinger extended the right to appointed counsel to any "person [who] may be imprisoned for
any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony." Id. at 37. Scott v. Illinois, 440
U.S. 367 (1979), later limited the right to cases in which the court actually imposed a term of

incarceration. Id. at 373-74.
133. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
134. Gault, 387 U.S. at36.
135. Id. (citing Powell, 287 U.S. at 69).
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Gaultalso quoted extensively from, and endorsed the recommendations
of, the Report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice, which had been published earlier the same year:
The Commission believes that no . .. action holds more
potential for achieving procedural justice for the child in the
juvenile court than provision of counsel. The presence of an
independent legal representative of the child, or of his parent,
is the keystone of the whole structure of guarantees that a
minimum system of procedural justice requires. The rights to
confront one's accusers, to cross-examine witnesses, to
present evidence and testimony of one's own, to be unaffected
by prejudicial and unreliable evidence, to participate
meaningfully in the dispositional decision, to take an appeal
have substantial meaning for the overwhelming majority of
persons brought before the juvenile court only if they are
provided with competent lawyers who can invoke those rights
effectively. The most informal and well-intentioned ofjudicial
proceedings are technical; few adults without legal training can
influence or even understand them; certainly children cannot.'36
Gault's unequivocal endorsement of a right to counsel for juveniles that
parallels its adult counterpart established juvenile right to counsel as the
foundation for all of the other due process rights recognized in juvenile
court.
Twelve years after Gault, the Supreme Court decided Fare v. Michael
C., which upheld a teenager's waiver of his right to counsel at a pretrial
custodial police interrogation.' 37 After being picked up, taken to the police
station, and there advised of his Mirandarights, sixteen year old Michael
asked to speak to his probation officer.' The interrogating officers refused
his request,' 39 so Michael agreed to talk. He then proceeded to make
136. Id. at 38 n:65 (quoting PRESIDENT'S CRIME COMM'N NAT'L CRIME COMM'N REP. 86-87
(1967)).
137. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 728 (1979).
138. Id. at710.
139. Id. at 710-11. One of the two police officers first told Michael, "Well I can't get a hold
of your probation officer right now. You have the right to an attorney." Id. at 710. After more
discussion, the officer said,
Well I'm not going to call [your probation officer] tonight. There's agood chance
we can talk to him later, but I'm not going to call him right now. If you want to
talk to us without an attorney present, you can. If you don't want to, you don't
have to .... That's your right. You understand that right?
Id. at 711. After Michael said "Yeah," the officer continued, "Okay, will you talk to us without
an attorney present?" Id.
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statements that implicated himself in a murder.' On the State's appeal
from an adverse ruling in the California courts, the Supreme Court held that
Michael's request to speak with his probation officer did not constitute a
perse invocation ofhis right to remain silent and, therefore, that Michael's
statements to the police should not have been suppressed.'
Fare'sholding is disturbing, particularly in light of Gault's explicit
recognition that "special problems may arise with respect to [the] waiver of
the privilege [against self-incrimination] by or on behalf of children,"'4 and
its statement that the "participation of counsel will, of course, assist the
police, Juvenile Courts and appellate tribunals in administering the
privilege."' 43 The Gault Court had gone even further, sounding a caution:
If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when
an admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to
assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only
that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not
the product of ignorance or adolescent fantasy, fright or
despair.' 44
Fare'sinsistence, however, that Michael C's request to speak with his
probation officer was not the functional equivalent of a request for a lawyer
is a telling statement about the Court's assessment of the significance of
counsel for one accused of criminal conduct. In explaining its ruling, the
Court emphasized
the unique role the lawyer plays in the adversary system of
criminal justice in this country. Whether it is a minor or an
adult who stands accused, the lawyer is the one person to
whom society as a whole looks as the protector of the legal
that person in his dealings with the police and the
rights of
45
courts.

In contrast, the Court said, a probation officer's duty to his employer, the
State, "in many, if not most, cases would conflict sharply with the interests
of the juvenile.' 46 Thus, a probation officer could not be expected to give
the accused the type of independent advice and protection that an accused

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id. at724.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 55.
Id.
Id.
Fare,442 U.S. at 719.
Id. at 721.
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would receive from his lawyer. 47 "It is this pivotal role of... counsel...
from the request for a probation
that distinguishes the request for counsel
'4
officer, a clergyman, or a close friend.' 1
Against this recognition of the significance of legal representation, one
would expect some expression of concern about juvenile waiver of right to
counsel, if not an outright prohibition. But even Gault had intimated in
dictum that Gerald and his mother 149 could have chosen to waive his right
to counsel, if only they had been properly informed of the right:
They had a right expressly to be advised that they might retain
counsel and to be confronted with the need for specific
consideration of whether they did or did not choose to waive
the right.If they were unable to afford to employ counsel, they
... to appointed counsel, unless they chose
were entitled
50
waiver."'
The Court did not explain these statements, but merely cited without
discussionJohnsonv. Zerbst,"' its own 1938 decision establishing the right
of an adult criminal defendant to waive right to counsel upon proof that the
accused had made the waiver "competently and intelligently." ' 2 The
147. Id.
148. Id. at 722.
149. Given the facts of the case-i.e., that Gerald Gault's mother appeared in court with
him-we do not know what the Court would have said about waiver if he had appeared alone.
This Article assumes for purposes of discussion that the Court's comments would have been the
same. Mrs. Gault's presence does not so alter consideration of the rights of her son as to suggest
the opposite conclusion, for reasons of conflict of interest between parent and child, particularly
when the parent is the complainant or does not want to incur the expense of retaining counsel. See,
e.g., In re Manuel R., 543 A.2d 719, 720-21 (Conn. 1988) (discussing a mother who essentially
waived right to counsel so that she did not have to deal with her son at home; after public defender
withdrew, the hearing would be continued, and mother wanted to get the matter resolved that day
and have her son sent away); In re K.S., 216 S.E.2d 679 (Ga. App. 1975) (discussing how a
mother, as complainant, could not waive counsel on behalf of her child); In re Nation, 573 N.E.2d
1155, 1157 (Ohio App. 3d 1989) (discussing how a mother was complainant; therefore waiver
was deficient); see also PURITZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 45 (explaining results of study, reporting
that some parents pressure their child into waiving because of fears they will have to pay for
counsel, and others believe that waiving counsel will "lessen the blow" for their child).
150. Gault,387 U.S. at 42 (emphasis added).
151. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
152. Gault, 387 U.S. at 42 n.71; see also Johnson, 304 U.S. at 467-68. In Johnson, the
defendant had been unable to employ counsel for trial and was not entitled to appointed counsel
on the federal counterfeiting charges brought against him because the State of Georgia, where
Johnson was tried, appointed counsel for indigent defendants only in capital cases. Id. at 459-60.
When Johnson appeared in court and told the judge that he had no lawyer, the judge asked if he
was ready for trial. Id. at 60. Johnson responded affirmatively and was tried, convicted, and
sentenced without the assistance of counsel. Id. On appeal from the lower court's denial of
Johnson's habeas corpus petition, the Supreme Court reversed and stated, "[the right to counsel]
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Court's tacit acceptance of the possibility that Gerald Gault, a juvenile,
could meet Johnson's "competent and intelligent" standard for waiver of
right to counsel is perplexing when read in conjunction with the Court's
emphasis on representation by counsel as the cornerstone of fundamental
fairness injuvenile court proceedings."' Yetjuveniles' waiver oftheir right
to counsel has both a long and robust history and a pervasive continuing
presence in many juvenile courtrooms across the country.
III. JUVENILE WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL

A. Waiver Defined
In Johnson v. Zerbst, the Supreme Court stated the commonly
recognized test for waiver of any right: "A waiver is ordinarily an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment ofa known right or privilege."'
Thus, any inquiry into the validity of a waiver must focus on the holder 1of
55
the right and must determine the knowledge and intent of that person.
The rights holder first must know of the right and then make an intentional
choice to relinquish it. Otherwise, there is no waiver.
The history ofjuvenile waiver of right to counsel, however, shows that
what has passed for waiver often manifests neither knowledge nor intent.
Instead, juveniles have been systematically denied their right to counsel
without even knowing they had such a right. What is most disturbing is that
those practices are not simply a historical footnote; to the contrary, a
startling culture of waiver prevails in many courtrooms across the country
today.

embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the
professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his
life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel." Id. at
462-63. The Court held that a person accused of committing a crime could waive the right to
counsel only upon proof that the accused had made the waiver "competently and intelligently,"
based on the particular facts and circumstances of the case, "including the background,
experience, and conduct of the accused." Id. at 464, 467-68. Because the record contained
insufficient evidence to prove that the defendant's waiver was competent and intelligent, the Court
reversed the denial of the habeas petition. Id. at 469.
153. Of course, in Gault, both the boy and his mother were present in court, and it was the
mother on whom the Court seemed to rely for the waiver decision. Id. at 42. However, permitting
parents to waive their child's right to counsel is not the answer. To the contrary, it has its own set
of problems. See supra note 149.
154. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464.
155. See id.
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B. Pre-GaultWaiver
1. Waiver by Juveniles in Criminal Court Proceedings
Reported decisions upholding waiver of right to counsel by teenagers in
adult criminal court date to the 1920s.156 The earliest cases acknowledge the
criminally accused's constitutional right to counsel, but imply waiver of the
right from a defendant's failure to appear in court with or to request a
lawyer. A 1926 Minnesota decision upholding an implied waiver by a
seventeen year old accused of grand larceny exemplifies the early cases."5 7
At the arraignment, the trial judge asked the defendant, "Do you wish to
have [an attorney], or are you ready to enter a plea?"' 58 The boy responded
with a guilty plea.'59 In upholding the boy's waiver, the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it proceeded
to judgment and sentencing without advising the boy of his rights, because
the evidence showed that the boy had a prior conviction for a similar crime
and had appeared in court on his latest charges without counsel, even after
a ten day lapse between filing of the charges and arraignment. 6 °
While some state courts required appointment of counsel for juveniles
facing murder charges as early as the 1920s, 161 the first case in which the
court extended the right to those accused of lesser charges appeared in

156. See W.M. Moldoff, Annotation, What Constitutes Waiver ofRight to Counselby Minor
Accused, 71 A.L.R.2d 1160 (1960) (superseded by Christopher Bello, Annotation, Validity and
Efficacy of Minor's Waiver of Right to Counsel- Modern Cases, 25 A.L.R. 4th 1072 (1983)).
157. State v. McDonnell, 206 N.W. 952, 952-53 (Minn. 1926) (upholding conviction based
on guilty plea to grand larceny in the first degree); see also State v. Bafaro, 262 P. 964 (Wash.
1928) (upholding seventeen-year-old's guilty plea to uttering a forged check, even though not
represented by counsel, where he was aware of the consequences of the plea).
158. McDonnell, 206 N.W. at 952.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 952-53. Similarly, in a 1935 Michigan case, a fifteen year old was removed from
school, charged with murder, convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment, all in one day and
all without benefit of counsel. People v. Crandell, 258 N.W. 224, 224-25 (Mich. 1935). On
appeal, the state supreme court acknowledged that the law afforded the boy the benefit of counsel,
but held that because the boy had not requested a lawyer, the trial court was under no obligation
to provide counsel for him. Id. at 225-26.
161. E.g., State v. Oberst, 273 P. 490,490-94,496 (Kan. 1928) (reversing judgment and life
sentence entered on seventeen-year-old's guilty plea to murder of all seven members of his family,
where defendant alleged he was "wholly ignorant" of his rights and court procedures and
language; "[t]he one thing this youngster needed more than anything else before pleading guilty
to such a horrifying accusation was consultation with and advice of a good lawyer"); Howington
v. State, 235 P. 93 1, 932-35 (Okla. 1925) (reversing judgment and death sentence imposed two
days after homicide and one day after defendant's arrest, where defendant was orphaned by the
age of two, had never gone to school, and had pled guilty without being advised of his right to
appointed counsel, and where nothing in the record showed that the defendant had waived the
right).
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1932. In Harrisv. State,' 62 an Indiana trial judge accepted the guilty pleas
of two minors and sentenced them to life imprisonment for robbery and
aggravated assault without advising them of their rights or asking them if
they had or desired counsel. 163 On the boys' appeal, through appointed
counsel, the Indiana Supreme Court summed up the problem:
The appellants were prevented from asserting and enjoying the
right of a legal defense by reason of their ignorance of their
rights under the Constitution. Being ignorant of their rights,
they cannot be held to have been negligent in not asserting the
64
same. The court,it by
not. inquiry, could have learned of their
didproper
but
ignorance,
The remedy for the trial judge's error, the supreme court ruled, was to
reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial at which
defendants were accorded their basic constitutional rights-to have counsel
advised of their rights and of the
before, as well as at trial, and to be fully
1 65
consequences of entering a guilty plea.
In the late 1940s, a decade afterJohnson v. Zerbst, a number of teenage
waiver cases reached the United States Supreme Court. The Court issued
a series of decisions overturning the state court convictions of teenage
defendants who had entered guilty pleas or who had gone to trial without
counsel. 166 The Court did not explicitly apply Johnson v. Zerbst's
"competent and intelligent" standard, although it focused in each case on
the defendants' inability to comprehend the legal proceedings because of
their age, mental state, ignorance of their rights, and unfamiliarity with
court procedures. 67 The Court's statement in one of those cases, Wade v.

162. 181 N.E. 33 (Ind. 1932) (reversing trial court's denial of petitions for writs of coram
nobis and ordering new trial).
163. Id. at33-34.
164. Id. at35.
165. See id.
166. The Court overturned three convictions entered on guilty pleas: Uveges v. Pennsylvania,
335 U.S. 437, 442 (1948); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 562-63 (1947); DeMeerleer v.
Michigan, 329 U.S. 663, 665 (1947); and in a fourth case overturned a conviction based on the
trial court's denial of the defendant's request for counsel, Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 675, 684
(1948).
167. In DeMeerleer v. Michigan, the trial court had accepted the seventeen-year-old
defendant's guilty plea to first degree murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
DeMeerleer, 329 U.S. at 664-65. The Supreme Court reversed, based on a record that showed
"considerable confusion in [the boy's] mind at the time of the arraignment as to the effect of [the]
plea' and that he "was hurried through unfamiliar legal proceedings without a word being said
in his defense" or any offer of counsel. Id. In Marinov. Ragen, the Court overturned the guilty
plea of an eighteen-year-old who had been in this country only two years and did not understand
English, but only after he had served twenty-two years in prison on his murder conviction. Marino,
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Mayo, 168

is illustrative of its concerns: "There are some individuals who, by
reason of age, ignorance or mental capacity, are incapable of representing
themselves adequately in a prosecution of a relatively simple nature ....
Where such incapacity is present, the refusal to appoint counsel
is a denial
169
of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment."
The Supreme Court finally addressed Johnson v. Zerbst directly in 70a
1957 criminal case involving a teenage defendant. InMoore v. Michigan,'
the Court extended to state court proceedings the "competent and
intelligent" standard that it had established for waiver of right to counsel in
federal criminal cases two decades earlier in Johnson.'7 ' Willie B. Moore
was a seventeen-year-old black youth with a seventh grade education when
he pled guilty to the murder of an elderly white woman and was sentenced
to "solitary confinement at hard labor for life without possibility of parole,"
the maximum penalty allowable under Michigan law.'" Moore had served
nearly twenty years in prison when the Supreme Court reversed and

remanded the case for a new trial after concluding that Moore had not
intelligently and understandingly waived his right to counsel. 73 The Court's
conclusion was based on Moore's youth, limited education, and diminished

332 U.S. at 562. The seventeen-year-old defendant in Uveges v. Pennsylvaniahad pled guilty to
multiple burglaries and was given a twenty to forty year sentence. Uvegas, 335 U.S. at 438-39.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, stating that Uveges was "young and inexperienced
in the intricacies of criminal procedure when he pleaded guilty." Id. at 442. In the fourth case,
Wade v. Mayo, the trial court had denied defendant's request for counsel based on an absence of
state law requiring appointment of counsel in non-capital cases. Wade, 334 U.S. at 675. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that right to counsel "stems directly from the Fourteenth
Amendment and not from state statutes." Id. at 684.
168. 334 U.S. 672 (1948).
169. Id at 684. The Court was not unified on the waiver issue, however. During the same
time period, the Court held in two cases that the teenage defendants had waived their right to
counsel at trial by appearing without counsel at sentencing and failing to raise the issue then.
Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145, 146-49 (1947) (relying on Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82
(1946), to reject defendant's claim that he was improperly sentenced based on the inclusion of a
prior sentence imposed when he was sixteen and incapable of intelligently and competently
waiving his rights); Canizio, 327 U.S. at 85-87 (holding that defendant had the benefit of counsel
even though the trial court had not informed him of his right). Dissenters in both cases decried the
Court's implied waiver rationale, citing the defendants' youth, indigence, and ignorance of their
rights and echoing the caution sounded by Gayes, 322 U.S. at 150, 151 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting)
(noting that defendant was a sixteen-year-old boy who was "indigent and alone," and stating "I
am unwilling to subscribe to such a doctrine of forfeitures concerning constitutional rights...").
Wade, 334 U.S. at 684 (Reed, J.,
dissenting); Canizio, 327 U.S. at 88 (Murphy, J., dissenting)
(stating that a defendant who was nineteen, indigent, poorly educated, orphaned, and ignorant of
his right to counsel could not competently and intelligently waive his right to counsel).
170. 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
171. Id. at 161-62; see also supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
172. Id. at 160.
173. Id. at 164-65.
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mental capacity," along with evidence that he was emotionally disturbed. 75
Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, the Court focused on evidence that the
Sheriff had planted fears of mob violence in Moore's mind by telling him
that "if I didn't plead guilty to this crime, they couldn't protect me, under
those conditions, they says, during the riot."' 76 The Court concluded by
stating, "[a] rejection of federal constitutional rights motivated by fear
cannot, inthe circumstances of this case, constitute an intelligent waiver."' 77
With Moore, the constitutional standard for ajuvenile's waiver of right
to counsel in criminal court was" made uniform, whether the defendant
found himself in federal or state court. No court could deny right to counsel
to any criminal defendant, adult or child, unless the evidence showed, based
on the circumstances of the case, that the defendant had waived the right
"competently and intelligently." As the wide disparity in later rulings
discussed below shows, however, any expectation that the rule would have
a broad prophylactic effect in juvenile court proceedings was misguided at
best. Indeed, the caution urged by the Supreme Court in Wade v.Mayo,
that some individuals, "by reason of age... are incapable of representing
themselves,"' 78 appears to have been lost on juvenile court judges.
2. Waiver in Juvenile Court Proceedings
Unlike adult criminal courts, fewjuvenile courts accorded juveniles the
right to counsel in delinquency proceedings before Gault. The common
rationale for rejection of the right to counsel for juveniles was the judicial
position that a proceeding under the delinquency statutes was not criminal,
but civil, its purpose being not punishment or retribution, but the care,
custody, and control that the child's parents had failed to provide. 179 Among

174. Id at 164.
175. Id. at 158-59 (discussing how the trial transcript reflected judge's statement that
defendant "insists that there is something wrong with his head; that he has had something akin
to queer sensations before this").
176. Id. at 163-64 (quotation marks omitted) (discussing how defendant testified that after
the Sheriff told him he couldn't protect him "then there wasn't nothing I could do. I was mostly
scared than anything else").

177. Id. at 164.
178. Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 684 (1948).
179. See, e.g., White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (stating that since
juvenile court proceedings are not "criminal and penal in character, but are an adjudication [of]
the status of a child in the nature of a guardianship by the state as parens patriae ...,
[c]onstitutional safeguards guaranteed one accused of crime... are not applicable"); State v.
Dotson, 299 P.2d 875,877 (Cal. 1956) (stating that the denial of right to counsel in juvenile court
was not a denial of due process; such proceedings are "in the nature of guardianship proceedings
in which the state as parens patriae seeks to relieve the minor of the stigma of a criminal
conviction and to give him corrective care, supervision and training"); People ex reL Weber v.
Fifield, 289 P.2d 303, 304 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955) (stating that duty to advise an accused of
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the pre-Gault reported decisions in which juvenile courts recognized
juveniles' right to counsel, only two, both in the District of Columbia,
explicitly required a "competent and intelligent" waiver of the right.
In the first of the cases, Shioutakon v. Districtof Columbia,8 ° a fifteenyear-old admitted the charge of using an automobile without the owner's
consent and was committed to a training school without being advised of
his right to counsel.' The appeals court first construed the juvenile code
to require "the effective assistance of counsel in a juvenile court quite as
much as it does in a criminal court."' 82 The court then held that "where that
right exists, the court must be assured that any waiver of it is intelligent and
competent," as determined by the child's "age, education, and information,
and all other pertinent facts."'8 3
In the second case, McBride v. Jacobs,' the juvenile court committed
a seventeen-year-old to a training school after the boy's mother declined
counsel and the boy admitted committing "an unlawful act."' 85 The court
had informed the boy's mother of his right to counsel, but had not informed
the boy.'86 Based on thejuvenile court's failure to advise the boy of his right
to counsel, the D.C. Circuit reversed and repeated Shioutaken'sruling that
' 87
any waiver, by parent or child, must be "an intelligent, knowing act."'
During this period, no court appears to have challenged the efficacy of
the waiver of right to counsel by juveniles, in either criminal or juvenile
court. The most a juvenile could hope for on appeal from a misguided
waiver decision was that the court would consider the Johnson v. Zerbst
standard for adult waiver in determining the validity of his waiver of right
to counsel. As long as the waiver met the "competent and intelligent" test,
it would be valid. How Gault'sconstitutionalization of juveniles' right to
counsel would affect waiver is the subject of the following discussion.

right to counsel applies only to criminal prosecutions, and juvenile delinquency proceedings are
not criminal); Robinson v. State, 204 S.W.2d 981, 981-82 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (stating that
because delinquency proceeding was civil rather than criminal, whether confession was made
during illegal arrest was immaterial).
180. 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
181. Id. at 667.
182. Id. at 669.
183. Id. at 670 & n.26 (quoting Williams v. Huff, 142 F.2d 91, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1944))

(quotation marks omitted).
184.
185.
186.
187.

247 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
Id at595.
Id at 596.
Id.
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C. Post-GaultWaiver in the Juvenile Courts
1. Introduction
The tension between an accused's constitutional right to a fundamentally
fair adjudication process and waiver of the right to counsel goes to the heart
ofpost-Gaultjuvenile court proceedings. Gault'sdue process guarantee of
fundamental fairness is empty if it does not ensure that a juvenile accused
of committing a crime receives a fair trial. But even the Gault Court failed
to question whether juvenile waiver of right to counsel might contravene
the fair trial rights it had just announced. Nor has any subsequent court
questioned Gault's tacit acceptance of the constitutional viability ofjuvenile
waiver. Indeed, the Supreme Court has appeared reluctant to make any
definitive statement, beyond the general language of Johnson v. Zerbst,
concerning the extent of inquiry necessary for a valid waiver of counsel
even by an adult, despite a split in the circuits on the issue.' 88
2. Gault'sReception in the Juvenile Courts
From the beginning, many juvenile court judges were resistant to the
procedural formality imposed by Gault. They agreed with Justice Stewart,
who dissented in Gault, that the Court was wrong to extend criminal due
process protections to the juvenile courts."8 9 As a result, they refused to
apply the Gault protections in their courtrooms.'
Studies conducted within a few years of Gaultconfirm juvenile courts'
"poor compliance withmany of [Gault's]procedural requirements."'' One
study of three urban juvenile courts found that the highest rate of
compliance with Gault'sright to counsel directive was only fifty-six percent
in one court, and the rates in the other courts were dismal. 9 2 One judge
complied just three percent of the time, and the other never informed

188. See McDowell v. United States, 484 U.S. 980,980-81 (1987) (White and Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting from denial of petition for certiorari) (citing conflict among circuit courts concerning
the proper application and interpretation of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), as reason

for granting certiorari in present case).
189. MANFREDI, supranote 40, at 175.

190. Id.
191. Id. at 157 (citing Norman Lefstein et al., In Search of Juvenile Justice: Gault and its
Application, 3 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 491-562 (1969); Elyce Ferster et al., The Juvenile Justice
System: In Search of the Role of Counsel, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 375-412 (1971); B.C. Canon &
K.L. Kolson, Rural Compliance with Gault: Kentucky, A Case Study, 10 J. FAM. L. 300-26

(1971)).
192. Lefstein et al., supranote 191, at 510.
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juveniles of their right to counsel. 93
' Other researchers reported that in rural
areas, juveniles were advised only sporadically even two years after
Gault,9 4 and very few juveniles anywhere "received complete and
' One study reported such
unprejudiced advice of their right to counsel."195
prejudicial advisories of right to counsel as:
'1 6
"I certainly hope you don't want an attorney."
97
"Do you want a lawyer or do you want to speak for yourself?"'
'.I notice you are not here with an attorney and I assume that you 98
do
not wish an attorney. You may have one but it is not required."'
• "Most people charged with a minor charge don't have a lawyer. We
could 99go ahead. Then if you feel you need one you could ask for
1

one."

Later studies confirm that the courts' noncompliance did not abate as
judges became familiar with and adjusted to the new legal requirements
produced by the due process revolution in the juvenile courts. A study in
1988 revealed that many juveniles still were not being adequately informed
of their right to counsel and were appearing in court unrepresented.2 0 A
1993 study ofjuvenile right to counsel in Minnesota found that more than
one-half of children against whom delinquency petitions had been filed were
not represented by counsel,2' 0 and in some rural counties, over eighty
percent of twelve and thirteen-year-old children appeared without
counsel. 0 2 Other studies reported similar results.20 3

193. Id.
194. See Canon & Kolson, supra note 191, at 316.
195. MANFREDI, supra note 40, at 157 (citing Ferster et al., supra note 191, at 379)
(quotation marks omitted).
196. Ferster et al., supra note 191, at 379. The judicial attitude reflected by the quoted
statement may account for the mixed results reported in studies of the impact of legal
representation on the disposition ordered by the court. Ferster et al.'s 1970 study found that there
were fewer commitments to juvenile institutions and more findings of "not involved" when the
child was represented by counsel. Id. at 402. However, later research reported that children with
counsel often receive more severe treatment by the court than those without counsel. Feld, supra
note 5, at 227. Although the latter result is surprising, it may be explained by juvenile judges'
resistance to, and even resentment of, lawyers (other than prosecutors) in their courtrooms.
197. Ferster et al., supra note 191, at 379.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Feld, supra note 6, at 416.
201.

BARRY C. FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE JUVENILE

COURTS 46 (1993) (hereinafter JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN).
202. Id. at 244. Feld also studied rates of legal representation in the juvenile courts of
California, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania. Id. at 51.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss4/1

32

Berkheiser: The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile
JUVFNILE RIGHT TO COUNSEl.

3. Juvenile Waiver of Right to Counsel: Reported Decisions
a. Overview
Reported decisions in appeals challenging ajuvenile's waiver of counsel
are as unsettling as the studies discussed above. Research for this Article
revealed ninety-nine post-Gault appellate decisions that addressed the
validity ofajuvenile's waiver ofright to counsel after a delinquency petition
had been filed.' 4 In an overwhelming majority of the cases, eighty of the
ninety-nine, the waivers were overturned on appeal." 5 In those cases,
children as young as nine had been permitted to waive right to counsel,
while a waiver by an eleven-year-old boy was among those upheld on
appeal. 0 6
Analysis of the cases showed that in all but two of the nineteen in which
the waivers were upheld, the accused child had admitted the charges after
waiving counsel.207 Similarly, fifty-one ofthe eighty juveniles whose waivers
were overturned on appeal had entered admissions or pleas of nolo
contendere. °8 More often than not, the delinquency petitions alleged
serious felony charges. 0 9 Only a handful were status offenses (runaways,

Representation ranged from a low of 37.5% in North Dakota to a high of 95.9% in New York
State. Id. at 54-55; see also Barry C. Feld, Justice by Geography: Urban, Suburban,and Rural
Variations in Juvenile JusticeAdministration,82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 156, 192-94 (1991)
(hereinafter Justice by Geography).
203. PURITZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 7; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, JUVENILE
JUSTICE: REPRESENTATION RATE VARIED As DID COUNSEL'S IMPACT ON COURT OUTCOMES 15

(1995); A.B.A., AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RISK 60 (1993); Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in
Juvenile Court:An EmpiricalStudy of When Lawyers Appear andthe Difference They Make, 79
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185 (1989) (hereinafter EmpiricalStudy).
204. See generallyinfra Appendices A-D. Data from the cases is organized into two sets of
tables, produced as Appendices to the text of this Article. Appendices A and C collect the cases
overturning waiver and present, respectively, background information (age, charges, plea, and
disposition) and legal analysis (the juvenile courts' advisories regarding right to counsel, the
appellate courts' reasons for invalidating the waiver, and the statute and/or rule governing right
to counsel and/or waiver in the respective states). See generally infra Appendices A & C.
Appendices B and D collect the cases upholding waiver. See generally infra Appendices B & D.
Like Appendix A, Appendix B presents background information on each case, including age,
charges, plea, and disposition. See generally infra Appendix B. Appendix D summarizes the
courts' legal analysis, describing what each court said about right to counsel, the appellate courts'
reasons for upholding the waiver, and the statute and/or rule governing right to counsel and/or
waiver in the respective states. See generally infra Appendix D.
205. See infra Appendix A.
206. See infra Appendices A & B.
207. See infra Appendix B.
208. See infra Appendix A.
209. See infra Appendices A & B.
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truancies, curfew violations), and all were in cases overturned on appeal.21
Most of the juveniles whose waivers were upheld were committed to the
custody of the state agency responsible for delinquent youth; the remaining
youths were put on intensive probation.2 ' Nearly three-quarters of the
juveniles in the overturned cases had been committed to state custody. 212
The courts had specifically ordered most of those children to be confined
in a state "training school" or other institution, many for an indefinite period
of time, others ranging from five months to a maximum of eight years.2" 3
Juvenile courtjudges' advisories to accused juveniles concerning their
right to counsel were consistent with the results of the studies reported
above concerning judicial noncompliance with Gault. Over thirty percent
ofthejuveniles were not advised at all.21 In several cases, the juvenile court
record was silent regarding the rights advisories or waiver proceedings. 1 5
In others, the docket sheet or court minutes reflected only that the juvenile
had been informed of his right to counsel and had waived it.216 In many
cases, the judge informed the accused of his right to counsel and then
simply asked if he wanted a lawyer.217 In three other cases, the judge
merged the right to counsel inquiry with the entry of a plea.21

210. See infraAppendix A. Nine cases did not report the nature of the charges. See id.
211. See infraAppendix B.
212. See infraAppendix A.
213. See id
214. See infraAppendix C.
215. See infra Appendix C (citing In re Navajo County Juvenile Action No. JV-94000086,
898 P.2d 517 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); N.R.L. v. State, 684 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); J.H.
v. State, 679 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); In re D.L.A., 667 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995);
N.E.R. v. State, 588 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); In re Lytle, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 5028
(Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 7, 1997); In re Anzaldua, 820 P.2d 869 (Or. Ct. App. 1991)).
216. See infra Appendix C (citing C.G.H. v. State, 404 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
(discussing the minutes); R.V.P. v. State, 395 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (discussing the
docket sheet); In re Mason, 2000 WL 968800 (Ohio Ct. App. July 13, 2000) (discussing
magistrate's notes); Inre Solis, 706 N.E.2d 839 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (discussing ajournal entry);
In re Ward, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 1567 (Ohio CL App. July 12, 1997) (discussing magistrate's
notes); In re Montgomery, 691 N.E.2d 349 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (discussing journal entry); In re
Rohm, 1996 WL 183032 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 17, 1996) (discussing a referee's report)).
217. See infraAppendix C.
218. Id. (citing K.M. v. State, 448 So. 2d 1124, 1124-25 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (stating that
K.M. did not explicitly waive his right to counsel, just pled guilty, and was adjudicated
delinquent, all in a matter of minutes); In re Appeal No, 544, 332 A.2d 680, 684-85 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1975) (noting that a pre-filed answer indicated boy's waiver of right to counsel and
admission to the charges; court confirmed admission first; then said: "And also you are willing to
proceed here this morning without a lawyer," to which the boy nodded); In re Caruso, 1991 Ohio
App. LEXIS 2292, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. May 17, 1991) (noting that the court advised juvenile of
right to counsel and right to remain silent; then said, "Now, with all that information, I'm going
to allow you to either admit or deny this crime")).
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In the few cases in which the explanation of rights was relatively
complete, the courts conducted no waiver colloquy, simply concluding that
the waiver was valid from the juvenile's indication that he understood his
rights.219 Other cases so clearly reveal the involuntariness of thejuvenile's
waiver that the judge's acceptance of it is shocking. One such case is
G.L.D. v State,2 ' where the judge ordered the juvenile to surrender his
guitar and amplifier to the court in partial payment of the public defender's
fee." After a brief recess, the juvenile told the judge he did not want a
lawyer.22 The judge asked no questions, ignored the juvenile counselor's
attempt to interject the reason for the boy's change of mind-that he did
not want to lose his guitar-and proceeded to have the juvenile execute a
written waiver. 23
Even setting aside such blatant cases as G.L.D., the cases, viewed
together, present a bleak picture of juveniles' access to counsel. Many
juvenile courts do little, if anything, to assure that juveniles waiving their
right to counsel understand what they are doing. More specifically, the
cases compel two deeply disturbing conclusions: neither the presumption
against waiver nor the enactment of detailed statutory waiver procedures
have been effective constraints against juvenile court judges' continued
exercise of their "discretion" to deny juveniles their right to counsel.
b. Juvenile Courts' Disregard for the Presumption Against Waiver
The Supreme Court has often warned that trial court judges should
indulge "every reasonable presumption" against waiver of constitutional
rights by criminal defendants.224 Yet juvenile court practices as revealed in
the reported cases demonstrate a total disregard for the presumption. Not
a single court in nearly one hundred waiver cases conducted a thorough
inquiry into the circumstances to determine whether the juvenile's waiver
was knowing, voluntary and intelligent, and few courts acknowledged that
they were bound by a legal standard. 25 Most courts either said nothing or

219. See, e.g., J.G.S. v. State, 435 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); In re Jane Doe, 881 P.2d
533 (Haw. 1994); In re Clements, 770 P.2d 937 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
220. 442 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
221. Id. at 403.
222. Id.
223. Id.The judge did not even have the authority under Florida law to order the boy to turn
over his guitar and amplifier. Id. at 404. The judge should have inquired into the mother's
willingness and ability to pay, and if she could not afford a lawyer, a lien could be placed against
her property to secure payment of the public defender's fee. Id. at 403-04.
224. E.g., Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986); Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S. 1 (1972); Emspak
v. U.S., 349 U.S. 190 (1955).
225. See infra Appendices C & D.
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simply recited the adult waiver standard.22 6 Only a handful of cases went
further, some suggesting that the standard forjuvenile waiver was "at least
equal to" that accorded adults,227 and others stating that the court needed
to be 22
even
more careful or "particularly solicitous" of the juvenile's
8
rights.

In fact, in several cases that were overturned on appeal, the juvenile
court judges found "waiver by inaction. '

229

When the juvenile showed up

for the adjudication hearing without counsel, the court inferred waiver and
proceeded directly to the adjudicatory hearing.230 In the most recent of
those cases, In re ChristopherT,21 the boy's mother told thejudge that she
did not realize the gravity of the situation or she would have obtained

226. Id. A few courts that found the juvenile's waiver insufficient merely recited the adult
standard and cited a case or two, but made no express statement about the standard's applicability
to juveniles. J.G.S. v. State, 435 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); In re Caruso, 1991 Ohio App.
LEXIS 2292 (Ohio Ct. App. May 17, 1991); In re Nation, 573 N.E.2d 1155 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989);
In re Anzaldua, 820 P.2d 869 (Or. Ct. App. 1991); In re R.S.B., 498 N.W.2d 646 (S.D. 1993).
The Ohio Court of Appeals stated in three cases overturning waiver and two cases upholding it
that because there was "no material difference" between the constitutional requirements for
juvenile and adult right to counsel, case law regarding adult waiver was applicable to juvenile
waiver. In re Lytle, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 5028 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 7, 1997) (overturning
waiver); In re Montgomery, 691 N.E.2d 349 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (overturning waiver); In re
Ward, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2567 (Ohio Ct. App. June 12, 1997) (overturning waiver); In re
East, 663 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (upholding waiver); In re Peggy L., 1995 Ohio App.
LEXIS 5330 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 8, 1995) (upholding waiver). Three courts said generally that
the standard for juveniles was "no less than" for adults. In re Appeal No. 544, 332 A.2d 680, 688
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (noting "no less is required" than for an adult in a criminal
proceeding); In re D.L., 999 S.W.2d 291, 295 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) ("no less than"); In re John
D., 479 A.2d 1173, 1178 (R.I. 1984) (stating that court must scrutinize waiver admonitions "with
the utmost exactitude and care to be certain that they meet the requirements for adults").
227. See infra Appendix C (citing In re Manuel R., 543 A.2d 719, 725 (Conn. 1988)
("[T]hese constitutional and procedural guidelines apply with equal, if not greater, force in the
context of a delinquency proceeding ....[O]ur general policy of indulging every presumption
against the waiver of fundamental rights ... has special application in the context of juvenile
waiver.") (citation omitted); K.M. v. State, 448 So. 2d 1124, 1125 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (stating
that "the 'inquiry' for ajuvenile must be at least equal to that accorded an adult; nevertheless we
have intimated that a trial court should be even more careful when accepting a waiver of counsel
from a juvenile")).
228. See infra Appendix C (citing In re B.M.H., 339 S.E.2d 757, 758 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)
(making the defendant aware of danger of proceeding without counsel "particularly true in
juvenile cases as 'the state has a heavy burden'); In re Paul H., 365 N.Y.S.2d 900, 903 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1975) ("When dealing with an infant, courts should be particularly solicitous to protect
his rights and, in such cases, a 'heavy burden' rests upon the state to show a genuine waiver")).
229. See infra Appendix C (citing In re Christopher T., 740 A.2d 69 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1999); In re Kimble, 682 N.E.2d 1066 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); State v. Afanasiev, 674 P.2d 1199
(Or. Ct. App. 1984); In re R.S.B., 498 N.W.2d 646 (S.D. 1993)).
230. See generally id.

231. 740 A.2d 69 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999).
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counsel for the hearing.23 2 Her pleas were unavailing.233 The judge found
that she lacked "any good reason" for failing to obtain counsel, and rather
than "inconvenience" the victim, who was present, the court proceeded with
the adjudication.'2 4 In In re R.S.B.,"5 the juvenile told the judge he did not
want to proceed without a lawyer. 6 The boy's father catalogued for the
court his unsuccessful efforts to obtain counsel and stated his hope that they
would be able to get help from the public defender's office.237 The father's
and son's pleas fell on deaf ears."28 The judge proceeded with a full
evidentiary hearing without counsel for the boy and, at the conclusion ofthe
heating, adjudicated him delinquent."29 The court of appeals reversed and
chastised the trial court for assuming that "R.S.B. had waived his right to
counsel by appearing without an attorney.""24
Even in juvenile courts which did not so blatantly disregard juveniles'
right to counsel, the waiver proceedings did not reflect the thorough-going
inquiry contemplated by the "knowing, voluntary and intelligent" standard
and the "totality ofthe circumstances" test. That test, first articulated by the
United States Supreme Court inJohnsonv. Zerbst, requires an examination
of a multiplicity of factors to determine the validity of a waiver, including
the person's age, intellectual ability, educational level, emotional or mental
problems, and prior experience with the court system.24
Few of the waiver decisions discussed any of those factors. The courts
did not generally consider age to be a factor affecting the validity of the
waiver decision, even when the child was as young as nine.242 Only seven
cases discussed more than one factor, and in three cases, thejuvenile's prior
experience with the court 43 appeared to trump evidence concerning his

232. Id. at 71.
233. See id.
234. Id.
235. 498 N.W.2d 646 (S.D. 1993).
236. Id. at 647.
237. Id.
238. See id.
239. Id. The court proceeded to conduct the hearing, with R.S.B. and his father attempting
to question the state's witnesses. Id. At the conclusion, the court (as trier of fact) found R.S.B.
guilty of third degree burglary and committed him to the State Training School. Id.
240. Id.
241. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
242. See infra Appendix C (citing In re Christopher T., 740 A.2d 69 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1999) (acknowledging no consideration of circumstances; instead finding "waiver by
inaction"---appearing without counsel for a hearing where state's witnesses were present; judge
did not want to "inconvenience" witnesses)).
243. Psychologist Thomas Grisso's studies ofjuvenile waiver of right to counsel, discussed
in some detail infra at notes 352-63 and accompanying text, reports results that undermine one
of the principal bases relied upon by courts in upholding juvenile waivers under the totality of
circumstances measure. Grisso found that "prior court experience (for example, number of prior
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mental, emotional or medical problems.244 In the remaining four cases, the
judges concluded that the juvenile's waiver was valid despite evidence of
the child's educational deficiencies or emotional and behavioral problems.245
Even in the most extreme cases, the totality of the circumstances test did
not protect the child from an ill-advised waiver. In D.L. v. State,2 46 a
fourteen year old was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon, a third degree felony.247 In a method apparently favored by some
judges in Orange County, Florida, thejudge spoke to all thejuveniles in the
courtroom at once, lecturing them en masse about their right to counsel
(court-appointed if they were financially eligible), their other constitutional
rights, procedures for waiving and entering pleas, and other details. 248 At
D.L.'s individual hearing following the rights lecture, the judge asked him
if he wished to give up his right to a lawyer.249 D.L. said "Yes," and
immediately entered a guilty plea.250 During the plea canvass, the judge
asked D.L. if he had "any mental or emotional disabilities," to which D.L.
responded "No."251 The judge then accepted his plea. At a subsequent
hearing on D.L.'s motion to withdraw the plea (after he had obtained
counsel), D.L.'s mother and caseworker testified that D.L. suffered from

felony referrals) bears no direct relationship" to juveniles' understanding of their rights. THOMAS
GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE 194 (1981).

244. K.E.S. v. State, 216 S.E.2d 670,671 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (discussing ajuvenile that was
in a hospital psychiatric ward at the time of the charge, was "strung out" on marijuana, and living
with an older man, but it was her third juvenile court appearance); In re Appeal No. 544, 332 A.2d
680, 685 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (discussing ajuvenile who had possible undisclosed medical
problems, but also had prior delinquency); In re Ward, 1997 WL 321492, at *I (Ohio Ct. App.
June 12, 1997) (discussing ajuvenile who had psychiatric problems, was under a doctor's care,
and was taking psychotropic drugs, appeared in court alone; was on parole for prior delinquency).
245. J.R.V. v. State, 715 So. 2d 1135, 1137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (stating that the child's
intelligence was "borderline at the very best"; he had undergone psychotherapy since car accident
at age eleven, and was diagnosed with dysthymic brain disorder, dyslexia, and lack of impulse
control); D.L. v. State, 719 So. 2d 931, 933-34 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (noting that the child had
multiple mental Tiealth and emotional disorders and attended special school); In re D.L., 999
S.W.2d 291, 295 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that the child was only thirteen, had an IQ of 95,
could not read, was diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and attended
special classes at school); In re Paul H., 365 N.Y.S.2d 900, 903-05 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (noting
that the fourteen-year-old read at a third grade level and was subjected to a neglectful home
environment when brought to court on PINS charges for being beyond his father's control).
246. 719 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
247. Id.
248. See id. at 932. This "group rights" advisory, which goes on for several lengthy, mindnumbing paragraphs, appears to be popular with a certain Judge Donald E. Grincewicz in
Florida's Fifth District. See also B.F. v. State, 747 So. 2d 1061, 1062-63 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000);
J.RV., 715 So. 2d at 1136-37.
249. D.L., 719 So. 2d at 933.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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mental health and emotional problems, was on medication for the problems,
and attended a special "behavioral school."' The caseworker further stated
that he did not believe D.L. could understand the nature of his plea, and the
mother concurred. 3 In spite of that information, the judge denied the
motion.2 4 The appeals court summarily reversed, stating that the
information from the child's mother and caseworker should have cast "some
doubt" on D.L.'s ability to intelligently waive his right to counsel.2 5
Similarly, cases in which thejuvenile's waiver was upheld showed little
attention to the circumstances under which the waiver was made, and none
conducted a thorough analysis of the "totality" factors. Only four of the
nineteen cases considered two or more factors. 6 Like the cases
overturning waiver, priorjuvenile court experience appeared to be the most
significant factor in determining the validity of waiver, as reflected in four
cases. 2 7 It is hard to draw any conclusions from so small a sample, but the
cases suggest the disturbing conclusion that even appellate courts are given
to random and inconsistent application of the "knowing, voluntary and
intelligent" standard for waiver and the totality of the circumstances test.
Two Ohio Court of Appeals cases illustrate the basis for this conclusion.
In In re MarkB.,28 the court upheld the waiver of counsel by an elevenyear old who had a history of physical and sexual abuse by parents and
foster parents beginning when he was seven, and now was charged with

252. Id. at 933-34.
253. Id.
254. See id.
255. Id. at 934.
256. In re Maricopa County Juvenile ActionNo. JV-108721 & F-327521, 798 P.2d 364,366,
368 (Ariz. 1990) (noting that the juvenile completed school through ninth grade and was referred
to juvenile court twice before for theft and burglary); In re R.M., 252 A.2d 237,240 (N.J, Super.
1969) (noting that "While he was a slow learner, he had been consistently promoted in school and
had completed the ninth grade"; "no evidence that he was mentally incompetent. He had been
employed on various jobs after leaving school"; had two prior court referrals and was represented
by counsel only one time); In re R.D.B., 575 N.W.2d 420, 423 (N.D. 1998) (noting that the
sixteen-year-old was an average to above-average student who had several prior referrals to the
juvenile court); In re Mark B., 2000 WL 145130, at *1,3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2000)
(upholding the eleven year old child's waiver, even though he was "oftender years" and in special
education classes for behavioral problems, had been removed from his birth home at age seven
due to physical and sexual abuse, which were repeated by foster parents and other family
members, and was charged with a sex crime).
257. In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JV-108721, 798 P.2d at 368 (discussing
referral twice before, for theft in 1986 and burglary in 1988); Bennett v. Bennett, 355 N.W.2d
277, 280 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (noting "extensive experience in the [juvenile] court system");
In re R.M., 252 A.2d at 240 (noting a rape in 1966, driving without a license in 1967; had counsel
one time); In re Peggy L., WL 803443, *2 (Ohio CL App. Dec. 8, 1995) (discussing unspecified
"prior experience").
258. 2000 WL 145130 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2000).
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inappropriately touching a ten-year-old's penis." 9 After the judge advised
the boy of his right to counsel, the boy consulted briefly with his father
(who told the judge his son should not return to the family home) and then
waived both his right to counsel and his rights to remain silent and to have
a trial.26 The judge disposed of the case by committing the boy to the
custody of the state youth services department, "to impress upon [him] the
wrongfulness of his acts and to protect others from [his] sexually predatory
behavior.""26 The appeals court did not flinch; instead, it found this eleven
year old boy's intelligence to be "unquestioned" and discounted his
attendance at special education classes because they were for children with
"behavioral problems, not a lack of intellectual capacity."262 Without further
examination, the court of appeals concluded that, even though the accused
"was of tender years during these hearings,"263 the waiver of rights was
264
"knowing, voluntary, and intelligently given."
The second Ohio case, In re Peggy L.,265 presents an entirely different
picture; in fact, little picture at all. The record showed that the juvenile
referee advised the accused teenager ofher right to counsel and of her likely
commitment to the state juvenile facility for a minimum of six months and
a maximum up to age twenty-one; that the girl said she did not want a
lawyer; that the referee then asked if she understood what she was doing;
and that when she said she did, the referee accepted her statement as a
"waiver."266 On this record, the appeals court concluded that the waiver was
"voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently" made.267
These cases demonstrate a disturbingly cavalier attitude by the juvenile
courts toward a child's waiver of the right to counsel. Neither right to
counsel nor any other constitutional right can be relegated to the luck of the
draw, whether at thejuvenile or appellate court level. When even the courts
assigned responsibility for correcting the lower courts' errors cannot be
relied upon to protect this most basic right, the conclusion that something
must change is inescapable.

259. Id. at*1.
260. See id.
261. Id. at *4 (as stated by the court of appeals).
262. Id. at *3.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. 1995 WL 8003443 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 8, 1995).
266. Id. at *1.
267. Id. at *2. The appellate court decisions in Mark B. and Peggy L., see infra Appendix D,
are all the more disturbing because they are indistinguishable from other Ohio decisions
overturning waiver. See infra Appendix C.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss4/1

40

Berkheiser: The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile
JUVENILE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

c. Juvenile Courts' Resistance to Limits on Their Discretion
Since Gault,most states have enacted statutes codifying juveniles' right
to counsel, and many have promulgated court rules defining the procedures
to be followed in securing that right.268 The statutes vary widely. Some
contain no more than a cursory statement that juveniles have a right to
counsel;269 others apply the right to "all stages" or "every stage" of the
proceedings; 270 and some go beyond Gault and establish a right to counsel
for appeals, intake and detention proceedings, and "child in need of
supervision" hearings.27 Very few states flatly prohibit waiver of counsel
by juveniles,272 although a substantial minority of states have established
requirements, some quite stringent, for juvenile waiver of the right.273
The decisions in more than two-thirds of the collected cases were based
in whole or in part on juvenile court judges' failure to follow the mandates
of state statutes or court rules.27 4 In sixty-six ofthe eighty cases overturning
waivers, the reviewing courts cited such noncompliance by the lower
courts.27 5 The ineffectiveness of duly enacted statutes and court rules in
ensuring the validity of juvenile waivers demonstrates the resistance of
juvenile courtjudges to externally imposed limits on their discretion. Even
in states with the most specific and detailed directives for the acceptance of
juvenile waiver, judges often fail to provide juveniles with the most basic
reading of their rights. A review of the Florida cases illustrates this latter
finding.

268. See Caeti et al., supra note 12, at 622-23 (reporting that only six states-Delaware,
Hawaii, Michigan, Missouri, Mississippi, and New Hampshire-do not have statutory provisions
governingjuvenile right to counsel; most ofthose states apply the general criminal right to counsel
statute to juveniles). Research for this Article indicates that the classifications and numbers
reported in that study are not entirely reliable. Thus, the study is cited here only for its more
general statements concerning the substance of the statutes and their wide variance, not for the
accuracy of the classification of each state's statute.
269. Id. at 627 (reporting seventeen states and the District of Columbia).
270. Id. at 628 (reporting nineteen states).
271. Id. at 626, 629-30 (reporting nineteen states with various requirements in excess of the
Gault standard). A number of the states included here also appear in the prior count. Thus, the
total in the three categories is more than fifty.
272. See Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Juveniles' Waiver of the Right to Counsel, 13 AM. J. CRIM.
JUST. 38, 38 (Spring 1998) (citing IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.11(2) (1994); TEXAS FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 51.10(b) (1996)).
273. Caeti et al., supranote 12, at 623-24 (reporting that seventeen states have adopted either
aperse rule making right to counsel unwaivable by minors or other strict waiver requirements);
see also Shepherd, supra note 272, at 38-39 (citing New York Family Court Act § 249-a (1987),
and court rules in Minnesota and Virginia).
274. See infra Appendix C.
275. See Appendix C.
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Florida has one of the clearest and most explicit waiver rules of any
state.276 Rule 8.165 of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure277 requires
the court to advise the child of his or her right to counsel and to appoint
counsel "unless waived by the child at each stage of the proceedings."278
Further, no child may be deemed to have waived counsel until the court has
completed "the entire process of offering counsel" and made a "thorough
inquiry" into the child's comprehension of her rights and her capacity to
waive counsel.27 9 The rule expressly prohibits acceptance ofwaiver "where
it appears that the party is unable to make an intelligent and understanding
choice because of mental condition, age, education, experience, the nature
'
or complexity of the case, or other factors."28
Notwithstanding the specificity ofthe rule, cases from Florida comprise
a significant proportion (twenty-seven) of the appellate decisions
overturning juvenile waiver of right to counsel,28 ' and the lower courts'
errors were not merely matters of "technical" noncompliance. In several
cases, the lower court appeared oblivious to the existence of any governing
authority and did not even fully advise the juveniles of their right to

276. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.165.
277. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.165. The full text of Rule 8.165, entitled "Providing Counsel to
Parties," provides:
(a) Duty of the Court. The court shall advise the child of the child's right to
counsel. The court shall appoint counsel as provided by law unless waived by the
child at each stage of the proceeding. This waiver shall be in writing if made at
the time of a plea of guilty or no contest or at the adjudicatory hearing.
(b) Waiver of Counsel.
(1) The failure of a child to request appointment of counsel at a particular stage
in the proceedings or the child's announced intention to plead guilty shall not, in
itself, constitute a waiver of counsel at any subsequent stage of the proceedings.
(2) A child shall not be deemed to have waived the assistance of counsel until the
entire process of offering counsel has been completed and athorough inquiry into
the child's comprehension of that offer and the capacity to make that choice
intelligently and understandingly has been made.
(3) No waiver shall be accepted where it appears that the party is unable to make
an intelligent and understanding choice because of mental condition, age,
education, experience, the nature or complexity of the case, or other factors.
(4) If a waiver is accepted at any stage of the proceedings, the offer of assistance
of counsel shall be renewed at each subsequent stage of the proceedings at which
the party appears without counsel.
Id.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id. 8.165(a).
Id. 8.165(b)(2).
Id. 8.165(b)(3).
See infra Appendix A.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss4/1

42

Berkheiser: The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile
JUVENILE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

counsel.2 82 Thejudge in one case denied without explanation the juvenile's
request for counsel at the hearing, but then provided counsel for purposes
of appeal.283 In many cases, the juvenile judge conducted little, if any,
inquiry to determine that thejuvenile's waiver was made "intelligently and
understandingly," as required by Rule 8.165(b)(2). 2" In other cases, the
to ignore evidence that the juvenile lacked the capacity to
court appeared
285
waive.
Because few cases contain a well-developed record of the proceedings
below, reversal often was based on the insufficiency of the record to
support the juvenile court's acceptance of waiver. JR. V V. State286 is a

282. See infra Appendix C (citing T.S. v. State, 773 So. 2d 635, 636 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
(noting that no advice was given regarding right to counsel); T.G. v. State, 741 So. 2d 517, 518
(Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (noting that no advice was given regarding right to counsel; the judge just
asked if the child wanted a lawyer, and the child said "no"); A.G. v. State, 737 So. 2d 1244, 124647 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (noting no explanation of rights; no inquiry into waiver; judge instead
became angry with A.G., venting her anger at cocaine peddlers and "ratchet[ing] up" A.G.'s
commitment from the probation officer's sentencing recommendation); A.P. v. State, 730 So. 2d
425, 426 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (noting no explanation of right to an attorney appointed by the
court); J.O. v. State, 717 So. 2d 185, 186 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (noting no mention by trial judge
of right to counsel or appointment of counsel); J.G.S. v. State, 435 So. 2d 942, 943 (Fla. 5th DCA
1983) (noting no explanation of right to counsel; judge simply asked J.G.S. if he "felt he needed
an attorney," to which he replied "No")).
283. See infraAppendix C (citing N.E.R. v. State, 588 So. 2d 289, 289 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
(ruling under predecessor Rule 8.290)).
284. See infraAppendix C (citing B.F. v. State, 747 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) ("trial
court failed to adequately explain his right to cousel and to determine that he knowingly and
intelligently waiv[ed] that right"); A.P. v. State, 740 So. 2d 1241, 1241 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) ("no
thorough inquiry into [juvenile's] comprehension of the offer of counsel or [his] capacity to...
waive"); P.L.S. v. State, 745 So. 2d 555, 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (noting no thorough inquiry,
under predecessor Rule 8.290, where judge's only question beyond asking P.L.S. whether he was
aware of his right to a lawyer free of charge was to ask his age); J.H. v. State, 679 So. 2d 67, 67
(Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (noting no thorough inquiry or renewal of offer of counsel, under predecessor
Rule 8.290); D.L.A. v. State, 667 So. 2d 330, 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (noting no thorough
inquiry regarding waiver and no renewal of offer of counsel at each stage of proceedings); K.M.
v. State, 448 So. 2d 1124, 1125 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (noting no thorough inquiry, under
predecessor Rule 8.290); G.L.D. v. State, 442 So. 2d 401,402-04 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (noting that
G.L.D. had first indicated that he wanted a lawyer, then withdrew his request after the judge
ordered him to deliver his guitar and amplifier to the court in partial payment of the public
defender's fee; no inquiry regarding waiver despite the obvious reason for the flip-flop, under
predecessor Rule 8.290); R.V.P. v. State, 395 So. 2d 291, 291-92 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (noting
no inquiry re waiver or renewal of offer of counsel, under predecessor Rule 8.290, despite
R.V.P.'s appearing at his adjudication hearing without counsel after stating at arraignment that
his mother intended to retain counsel); C.G.H. v. State, 404 So. 2d 400,401 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
(noting no circumstances of waiver in the record and failure to renew offer of counsel at later
stages of proceedings under predecessor Rule 8.290)).
285. See infra Appendix C (citing J.R.V. v. State, 715 So. 2d 1135, 1138 (Fla. 5th DCA
1998)).
286. 715 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
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notable exception. The evidence reported on the record in JR.V makes the
judge's ruling all the more troubling. The circumstances were similar to
those described in D.L. above." 7 In JR.V., the accused had diminished
mental capacity, borderline intelligence, and could not read or write.28 As
in D.L., the court read the juveniles their rights en masse, informing them
of their right to counsel and to court-appointed counsel if they were
financially eligible.289 After the extended lecture, the judge spoke briefly
with each juvenile.290 He asked J.R.V. if he understood his rights, and
J.R.V. responded that he did.29 ' After a series of questions to which J.R.V.
responded simply "yes" or "no," the judge announced, "Court finds that
you're alert and intelligent," and concluded that J.R.V. had given up his
right to counsel.292 After J.R.V. pled guilty to several felony charges of
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and then obtained counsel on his
own, he sought to withdraw his plea.293
Evidence in the record before the juvenile court at the hearing on the
motion to withdraw the plea, including expert testimony, showed that
J.R.V. suffered from dyslexia and lack of impulse control, and that he had
never fully recovered from a serious auto accident that had left him in a
coma for over a week afew years earlier.29 His intelligence was "borderline
at the very best," and he had only first or second grade language skills.29
In addition, J.R.V. repeatedly testified that he pled guilty because he
thought he would get out of detention and get to go home.296 The child
development expert confirmed J.R.V.'s testimony and concluded that he did
not enter his plea "freely and intelligently"; instead, the plea was based on
his faulty expectations. 29 7 Nevertheless, the court denied the motion. The
appeals court reversed, citing Rule 8.165.298 The court of appeals stated
that, at the motion hearing, "appellant's confusion and basic lack of
understanding regarding the nature ofthe criminal charges against him and
287. See supra notes 246-55 and accompanying text.
288. J.R.V.,715 So. 2d at 1137.
289. Id. at 1136.
290. See id.
291. Id. at 1137.
292. Id.
293. Id.at 1137-38.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1137.
296. Id at 1138. J.R.V.'s behavior reflects what child development studies have identified
as a difference between children and adults regarding temporal perspective. The studies
demonstrate that children and adolescents generally focus more on short-term consequences,
whereas adults are more oriented to consider the long-term consequences of a decision such as the
one in JR.V. See Elizabeth S. Scott, EvaluatingAdolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts,
19 J.LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 221, 231 (1995).
297. J.R.V., 715 So. 2d at 1138.
298. Id. at 1139.
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' The appeals
the consequences for entering a plea are readily apparent."299
court remanded with instructions to the juvenile court to conduct the
"thorough inquiry" mandated by Rule 8.165." 0
If the JR.V. court's complete disregard of the governing rules
represents one end of the spectrum, two decisions upholding waivers in
otherjurisdictions represent the other. The juvenile court in each case relied
exclusively on the juvenile court rules, to the exclusion of other legal
principles, notably burden of proof, in finding waiver.30' To make matters
worse, the courts of appeals upheld those decisions.
In Bennett v. Bennett3°2 and In re East,30 3 the Michigan and Ohio Courts
of Appeals upheld waivers based on the absence of a rule requiring the
juvenile court to do what the appellant argued it should have done.3° In
each case, the juvenile argued that his waiver should be overturned on two
grounds: first, because the juvenile court had failed to make a record of the
waiver proceedings, making it impossible for the state to establish that it
had met its burden of proving a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver;
and second, because the judge had failed to renew the offer of counsel at
later proceedings when the juvenile had waived his right to counsel earlier
in the case.305 Those arguments failed, the courts of appeals concluded,
because the juvenile court rules were silent as to any requirement that the
juvenile court make a record of the waiver proceedings or renew the right
to counsel advisory at later proceedings after an initial waiver.3 °6
While the ruling on the "renewal" issue is arguably sustainable, the
courts' confusion of the state's burden of proof with a technical rule
requirement certainly is insupportable. It strains credulity for a reviewing
court to conclude that the state had sustained its burden when there is no
record whatsoever upon which to make the required determination that the
juvenile's waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Tellingly, neither
state's rule endured. Shortly after the court of appeals ruling in East, Ohio
amended its juvenile court rules to require a record of all waiver

299. Id.

300. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
301. See generallyIn re East, 663 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Bennett v. Bennett, 355
N.W.2d 279 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
302. 355 N.W.2d 279 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
303. 663 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
304. Bennett, 355 N.W.2d at 280; East, 663 N.E.2d at 985.
305. Bennett, 355 N.W.2d at 279,280; East, 663 N.E.2d at 985-86.
306. Bennett, 355 N.W.2d at 279-80 (finding compliance with applicable rules, which
required neither renewal of offer of counsel after the first hearing nor a record of the waiver
proceedings); East, 663 N.E.2d at 985-86 (declining to impose record requirement, where rule
provided for making a transcript only "upon request" and lacked any requirement for advising of
right to counsel at all stages of proceedings once the right was waived).
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proceedings.3"7 Although Michigan was not as prompt as Ohio, its court
rules soon established a record requirement as well.3"' For those juveniles
whose rights were abused because of the courts' misplaced reliance on the
absence of a record requirement, however, the rule change offers no relief.
d. Conclusion
The eighty children and youths whose waivers were reversed on appeal
received the law's protection of their rights, even if belatedly. The law,
however, failed the children in most of the remaining cases. The outcome
of those cases does not bode well for juveniles in many jurisdictions.
Although many states were not among the cases reviewed here or were
represented by a single case from the 1970s or early 1980s, what that means
is unclear. It may mean that the absent state has a very good waiver
standard which is well administered in the juvenile courts, or it may mean
simply that no appeals are being filed.309
The resistance ofmany juvenile courtjudges to providing counsel to the
children appearing before them is just one of the challenges facing children
who appear in juvenile court without retained counsel. Precisely because
they are children, those against whom delinquency petitions are filed are
least able to execute a valid waiver of their right to counsel or to represent
themselves.
IV. JUVENILES' CAPACITY TO WAIVE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

A. The Law's Approach to Juvenile Capacity
The Supreme Court has long recognized that "the status ofminors under
the law is unique in many respects.""31 The Court's jurisprudence has

307. See OHIO R. JUV. P. 37(A). Ohio wasted no time. The amendment went into effect July
1, 1996, less than one year after East, which was decided July 17, 1995. See id.; see also East,
663 N.E.2d at 983. Ohio Juvenile Rule 37(A) provides:
The juvenile court shall make a record of adjudicatory and dispositional
proceedings in abuse, neglect, dependent, unruly, and delinquent cases;
permanent custody cases; and proceedings before magistrates. In all other
proceedings governed by these rules, a record shall be made upon request of a
party or upon motion of the court.
R. Juv. P. 37(A).
308. MICH. R. PROB. CT. 5.925. Michigan amended its court rules in 1988, stating: "A record
of the proceedings on the formal calendar must be made and preserved by stenographic recording
OHIO

or by mechanical or electronic recording ....
"Id. 5.925(B).

309. See infra notes 376-78 and accompanying text.
310. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979) (plurality opinion).
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tended to exhibit a certain protectionism toward children."' This protective
approach has led almost invariably to according children fewer rights under
the law, based
on children's presumed lack of capacity to exercise good
12
judgment.
The Court has ruled that because of their immaturity, children are
incapable ofmaking decisions concerning certain significant matters in their
lives.313 For example, the Court concluded in Parhamv. JR."4 that minors
have no due process right to notice and a hearing before being committed
by their parents to a mental institution.31 While it acknowledged that its
ruling implicated the liberty interest of minors,31 6 the Court focused instead
on the parent-child relationship:
The law's concept of family rests on a presumption that
parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and
capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult
decisions.... Most children, even in adolescence, simply are
not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions,
including their need for medical care or treatment. Parents can
and must make those judgments.3 7
Justice Stewart's concurrence in Ginsbergv.New York"1 8 demonstrates the
same reasoning in the First Amendment context: "I think a State may
permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely delineated areas, a
child-like someone in a captive audience-is not possessed of that full

311. But see generally Donald L. Beschle, The Juvenile Justice Counterrevolution:
Responding to Cognitive Dissonance in the Law's View of the Decision-Making Capacity of
Minors,48 EMORY L.J. 65 (1999) (discussing recent expansion of minors' autonomy in decision-

making in civil matters and persistence of paternalistic approach in juvenile delinquency/criminal
matters).
312. See generally Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal ConstructionofAdolescence, 29 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 547, 547-55 (2000).
313. See id.; see also Lee E. Teitelbaum & James W. Ellis, The Liberty Interestsof Children:
Due ProcessRights and TheirApplication, 12 FAM. L.Q. 153, 161 (1978). Teitelbaum and Ellis
point out, however, that "It]he fact of minority does not, of itself, always imply that the young
person lacks a constitutionally recognized ambit of choice." Id. at 164.
314. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
315. The Georgia procedures at issue required that designated mental health professionals
at the hospital agree with the parent or guardian that hospitalization was appropriate in the
particular circumstances. Id. at 590-91.
316. Id. at600-01.
317. Id. at 602-03.
318. 390 U.S. 29 (1968) (upholding New York statute prohibiting sale of obscene materials
to those under age seventeen; state could rationally conclude that exposure to proscribed materials
was harmful to well-being of young people).
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capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First
Amendment guarantees. 31 9
320 the Court articulated a general framework for
In Bellotti v. Baird,
determining when the State may impinge upon the constitutional rights of
minors in ways that would be impermissible for adults.32 Belotti specified
"three reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of
children cannot be equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability
of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature
manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing. 322 The
Court's explanation ofthe grounds for its first two reasons is relevant to the
discussion here. In discussing the first reason, the Court adverted to the
acceptance of juvenile courts as distinct from adult criminal courts to
support the State's entitlement "to adjust its legal system to account for
children's vulnerability. 323 As for the second reason, the Court stated that
in certain situations, the State may "limit the freedom of children to choose
for themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices with
potentially serious consequences" because juveniles "often lack the
experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that
could be detrimental to them. 3 24
In spite of those words of caution about adolescent decisionmaking, the
Court generally 325 has employed a reverse presumption of "decisional
competence ' 326 in the delinquency and criminal law settings, even with
319. Id. at 649-50. In his concurring and dissenting opinion in PlannedParenthood
ofCentral
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), Justice Stevens detailed further existing legal
protections against a child's bad judgment: "Because he may not foresee the consequences of his
decision, a minor may not make an enforceable bargain. He may not lawfully work or travel where
he pleases, or even attend exhibitions of constitutionally protected adult motion pictures. Persons
below a certain age may not marry without parental consent." Id. at 101-02.
320. 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion) (concluding that court may authorize abortion
for a minor without parental notification if court determines abortion is in a minor's best
interests).
321. Id. at 634.
322. Id.
323. Id.at 635.
324. Id.
325. The one notable exception is Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984), in which the
Supreme Court cited the Belotti rationale in upholding pretrial detention ofjuveniles against a due
process challenge. Id. at 265-66. The Court quoted the state supreme court's decision in stressing
the "desirability of protecting the juvenile from his own folly"---the commission of more crimes
if not detained. Id.at 26 (quotation marks omitted).
326. Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A Theoretical
Reformulation, 10 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 291, 298 (1992). Professor Bonnie, one of the leading
scholars on the insanity defense, has described the concept of"decisional competence" as one of
two broad types of abilities needed for defendants' effective participation in criminal proceedings,
the other being the capacity to assist counsel in developing and pursuing the defense. Id. at 29899. "Decisional competence," therefore, is a term not limited to juveniles, but refers generally to
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32 7

regard to applying the death penalty to juveniles. In Stanfordv. Kentucky,
the Court ruled that two boys aged sixteen and seventeen at the time the
crime was committed could be sentenced to death without offending the
Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.328
Paradoxically, under state law neither boy had the legal capacity to refuse
life-sustaining medical treatment. 9 Under the Court's ruling, the boys
could not choose to end their lives, but the State could. State courts and
legislatures evince this selective recognition of adolescent decisional
capacity as well, with incongruous and inconsistent results, exemplified by
laws in many states which allow a ten-year-old accused of a crime to be

tried as an adult, 33' but withhold his ability to contract with a lawyer to
represent him.331

B. The Social Science Evidence ConcerningJuvenile Capacity
Research by child development experts supports the Supreme Court's
solicitude for children and the protections the Court has erected for their
lack of decision making ability in non-criminal areas of the law. However,
nothing in the social science research suggests that juveniles encountering
criminal or delinquency proceedings should receive less protection. To the
contrary, empirical studies underscore the need for courts to rethink the
presumption of capacity that has dominated the delinquency system.
Juveniles' limited decisionmaking ability, coupled with their lack of

defendants' capacities for reasoning and judgment that are needed to make decisions in
proceedings affecting them, including decisions regarding waiver of right to counsel. Id.
327. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
328. Id. at 380. But see Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), where the United
States Supreme Court held that a state statute which permitted the execution of a man who was
fifteen at the time of the crime violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and
unusual" punishment. Id. at 838. Explaining its decision, the Court said, "there are differences
which must be accommodated in determining the rights and duties of children as compared with
those of adults." Id. at 823. The Court noted "the experience of mankind, as well as the long
history of our law, that the normal fifteen-year-old is not prepared to assume the full
responsibilities of an adult." Id. at 825. Further, the Court went on to say, "Inexperience, less
education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his
or her conduct." Id. at 835. If this rationale applies to a child's ability to evaluate the
consequences of criminal conduct, afortiori, it must apply to a child's ability to evaluate the
consequences of waiving right to counsel.
329. See Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifyingan Ageless Conundrum,
51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1267 (2000).
330. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense:
Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 503-07
(1987).
331. See MARTIN R. GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE LAW 91-120 (1997)
(comprehensive treatment of laws limiting and/or protecting juveniles); Hartman, supranote 329,
at 1267; see generally Beschle, supra note 311.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

49

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 54

understanding of their legal rights, undermine current practice in the
juvenile courts.
1. The Limits of Juvenile Decisionmaking
Like most other activities in life, decisionmaking and judgment are
learned skills. Wally Mlyniec, a clinical law professor who has represented
juveniles for many years, has observed that, "most people, subject to
hereditary limits, improve a skill each time they use it. Improvement of skills
upon repeated use applies to making judgments and decisions as well.
Decisionmaking involves, after all, a process of making choices among
competing courses of action.""33 Compared to adults, children and
adolescents have less knowledge and experience to aid them in making
decisions.333 Thus, "[i]n situations where adults see several choices,
adolescents may see only one. 334
Elizabeth Scott and Thomas Grisso describe differences in
decisionmaking ability as the developmental basis for the distinction
between juvenile and adult culpability:
The criminal law posits that the offender is a rational actor,
autonomously choosing 'to do the bad thing' on the basis of
personal values and preferences. The legitimacy ofpunishment
is undermined if criminal choices depart substantially from this
autonomy model. If youthful choices to offend are based on
diminished ability to make decisions, or if the choices (or the
values that shape the choices) are strongly driven by transient
developmental influences, then the presumption of free will
and rational choice is weakened.335
Scientific evidence of the long maturation process of the brain now
buttresses the work of developmental psychologists who have long known
that juveniles' thought processes are immature. 3 6 For example, children
who carry guns often do not anticipate using the gun or injuring anyone;
rather, the typical youthful gun toter just wants to scare someone or "look

332. Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity to
Choose, 64 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1873, 1885 (1996).
333. Scott, supra note 312, at 591; Elizabeth S. Scott, Criminal Responsibility in
Adolescence: Lessonsfrom DevelopmentalPsychology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 291, 293-94 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds.,
2000).
334. Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles:A Study of 17 Cases,
15 CRIM. JUSTICE 26, 27 (Summer 2000).
335. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution ofAdolescence: A Developmental
Perspectiveon Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 172-73 (1997).
336. Beyer, supranote 334, at 27.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss4/1

50

Berkheiser: The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile
JUVENILE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

'
In addition, while lack of impulse control is normal in
bigger."337
adolescents, it "does not predict poor judgment or psychopathology" in
adulthood.338 A desire to please both peers and adults, a high moral sense,
and intolerance of "anything that seems unfair" can lead to offenses that
appear to be calculated revenge but may, infact, be impulsive and moralistic
inorigin.39
Peer conformity also plays a powerful role in adolescent decisionmaking, rendering youths less able than adults to make decisions that are a
product of their own independent thinking.3 4 Simply sitting in a courtroom
and hearing others waive their right to counsel and enter guilty pleas, one
after another, can suggest to a teenager that he should do the same or he
will look foolish to his peers. This incapacity for independent judgment
influences adolescents to do what they think will make a judge or their
lawyer like them,341 not necessarily what is in their best interests. In
addition, adolescents do not think ahead342 and are prone to mistakes based
on their preference for short-term results,343 like getting to go home if they
just admit the charges, rather than looking ahead to the longer term effects
of a delinquency adjudication. 3" Moreover, adolescent experiences can
have a tremendous cumulative impact, with the result that bad decisions can
' Limiting the
"have long-term consequences that are difficult to reverse."345
legal consequences of juveniles' own ill-formed decisions, therefore,
represents soundjudicial policy, which should inform the law's approach to
all youth, not just those in non-criminal, non-delinquency legal fora.
Determining the specific measures that will afford the necessary
protections against poor decision making is complicated by the fact that,
compared to non-delinquent youth or adolescents in general, delinquent
youth have a much higher rate of mental disorders,346 such as substance

337. Id. Beyer also noted that all of the children in her study who were involved in shootings
said that "the gun 'went off,"' and they had no memory of pulling the trigger. Id.
338. led
339. Id. at 33.
340. Id; see alsoLaurence Steinberg& Robert G. Schwartz, DevelopmentalPsychologyGoes
to Court, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 9, 23
(Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (describing adolescence as "a period of
tremendous malleability, during which experiences in the family, peer group, school, and other
settings have a great deal of influence over the course of development").
341. Beyer, supra note 334, at 32-33.

342. Id at 33.
343. Id.; see also Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on
Children'sRights, 16 NOVA L. REV. 711, 716 (1992).
344. See infra notes 352-62 and accompanying text. This was one of Thomas Grisso's
findings in his study discussed more fully at notes 300-10 and accompanying text.
345. Steinberg & Schwartz, supra note 340, at 23.
346. The term "mental disorder" is used by the American Psychiatric Association to refer to
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abuse and dependence, psychosis, autism, conduct and attention deficit
disorders, mood and anxiety disorders, learning and academic disabilities,
and post-traumatic stress disorder.147 All of these disorders directly impair
decisionmaking and signal other personal and external influences that may
generate bad decisions.348 In a comprehensive study of over 1200 delinquent
detainees aged twelve to seventeen in Cook County, Illinois, nearly eighty
percent of the youth demonstrated at least one mental disorder, compared
to approximately twenty percent of youths in general. 49 Because psychosis,
autism, and learning disabilities were not included in the disorders identified
in the study, 5 ° the percentage of mentally disturbed delinquents may be
even higher.

a clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that
occurs in an individual and that is associated with present distress (e.g., a painful
symptom) or a disability (i.e., an impairment in one or more important areas of
functioning) or with a significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain,
disability, or an important loss of freedom.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL

DISORDERS xxi (4th ed., 1994).
347. Alan E. Kazdin, Adolescent Development, MentalDisorders,and DecisionMaking of
Delinquent Youths, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE
33, 34, 39 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000).
348. Id. at 40-41.
349. Id. at 40 (citing L.A. Teplin et al., PsychiatricDisordersAmong Juvenile Detainees,
Paper presented at the Annual Conference on Criminal Justice Research and Evaluation, at the
Bureau ofJustice Assistance, Office ofJuvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Washington,
D.C. (July 1998)). Other studies have shown similarly high rates of prevalence of mental
disorders. See, e.g., id. (citing S.P. Cuffe et al., Prevalenceof PTSD in a Community Sample of
OlderAdolescents,37 J. AMER. ACAD. CHILD& ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 147 (1998); R. McGee
et al., DSM-IIDisordersfrom Age 11 to Age 15 Years, 31 J.AMER. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRY 50 (1992); McGee et al., DSM-III Disordersin a Large Sample ofAdolescents, 29
J. AMER. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 611 (1990); R.K. Otto et al., Prevalence of
Mental Disordersin the Juvenile Justice System, in RESPONDING TO THE MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS
OF YOUTHS IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (J.J. Cocozza ed., 1992); H. Steiner et al.,
PosttraumaticStress Disorderin IncarceratedJuvenile Delinquents,36 J.AMER. ACAD. CHILD
& ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 357 (1997); UNITED STATES CONGRESS: OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, ADOLESCENT HEALTH (1991); N.Z. Weinberg et al., Adolescent Substance Abuse:
A Review of the Past Ten Years, 37 J. AMER. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 252
(1998)). The Cook County study is particularly significant because it was the first to employ the
diagnostic interview, the standard method for systematically evaluating the existence of mental
disorders. See Kazdin, supra note 347, at 40. The particular measure used by the Cook County
researchers was the Diagnostic Interview Schedule for Children. Id.
350. Id.
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2. Juveniles' Lack of Understanding of Their Legal Rights
Juveniles' limited decision making ability is compounded by their general
lack of comprehension of their legal rights. A 1970 study of juveniles'
understanding oftheir Mirandarights concluded that only five of eighty-six
juveniles understood their rights to counsel and to remain silent.35' In the
most frequently cited studies of juveniles' legal and psychological
competence to waive their rights, Thomas Grisso found that juveniles are
unlikely to understand either the rights they are being asked to waive or the
consequences of waiving them.352 Grisso's studies examined the
psychological capacity ofjuveniles to understand and effectively waive their
Mirandarights. 353 He studied the juvenile suspects' ability to understand the
words and phrases used in the Miranda warning and their cognitive
capacity to perceive the function and significance of the rights conveyed by
the warning. 354 Grisso reached the following conclusions: First,juveniles of
ages 14 and below demonstrate incompetence 355 to waive their rights to
silence and legal counsel;35 6 second, juveniles of ages 15 and 16 who have
IQ scores of 80 or below lack the requisite competence to waive their rights
to silence and counsel;357 and third, between one-third and one-half of

351. A. Bruce Ferguson & Alan Charles Douglas, A Study ofJuvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 39, 53 (1970) (concluding that only 5 of 86 juveniles understood their Miranda rights
before waiving them); see also Beyer, supra note 334, at 28 (noting that 10 out of 17 adolescents
did not understand Mirandawarnings); seegenerallyNormanLefstein et al., In Search ofJuvenile
Justice: Gault and lts Implementation, 3 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 491 (1969) (discussing an empirical
study ofjuvenile waiver demonstrating the difficulty of obtaining waivers with confidence that
they are knowing and voluntary).
352. GRISSO, supra note 243, at 193-94 (discussing series of studies); see generally Thomas
Grisso, Juveniles' Capacity to Waive MirandaRights: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 68 CAL. L. REV.
1134 (1980) (discussing one study, which compared juveniles' understanding of their rights with
adults' understanding) (hereinafter Juveniles' Capacity).
353. See generally GRISSO, supra note 243; Juveniles' Capacity,supranote 352.
354. GRISSO, supra note 243, at 131-32; Juveniles' Capacity,supra note 352, at 1143.
355. As used in Grisso's studies and the conclusions reported here, "competence" and
"incompetence" are defined in both psychological and legal terms. In a psychological sense,
"incompetence" means "that ajuvenile did not demonstrate a sufficient level ofperformance on
a criterion measure of understanding or perception of the rights. Specifically, we do not assume
that ajuvenile's inadequate performance is related to atrait, a maturational 'given,' an intellectual
limitation, or any other unalterable characteristic. We refer merely to the juvenile's condition of
deficient understanding or perception, both of which might be alterable." GRIsso, supranote 243,
at 194-95 (emphasis in original). "Competence," in a legal sense, refers to "those characteristics
ofthejuvenile which would address whether or not he or she was capable ofproviding a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary waiver." Id. at 195,
356. Id. at 193-94; Juveniles' Capacity,supra note 352, at 1160.
357. GRISSO, supranote 243, at 193-94; Juveniles'Capacity,supra note 352, at 1160.
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juveniles 15 and 16 years of age with IQ scores above 80 lack the requisite
competence to waive their rights.358
In conclusion, Grisso recommended aperse exclusionary rule for all
juvenile waivers.359 Compared with adults, younger juveniles'
comprehension oftheir legal rights was so deficient that their waivers could
not be considered to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. 6 The
exclusion should extend to 15 and 16 year olds, based on their inadequate
understanding of their legal rights, as demonstrated in the study.361
Although olderjuveniles tended to understand their rights as well as adults,
Grisso recommended consideration of aperse exclusionary rule for them
as well, because the study results indicated that adult levels of
understanding were "an imperfect standard for determining the adequacy of
'
older juveniles' comprehension."362
Grisso's findings are particularly disturbing when viewed in light of the
disproportionate number ofjuveniles adjudicated delinquent who have been
diagnosed as learning disabled. 63 "Learning disabilities are often the
manifestation of cognitive problems . . ." related to awareness and
judgment," and "learning disabled juveniles usually have deficient language
and communication skills."3 65 They do not, however, tend to exhibit low IQ
scores, but are generally "average or above average in intelligence. 366
While learning disabilities can have a profound negative impact onjuveniles'
abilities to understand and effectively exercise their rights, those individuals
may have escaped inclusion in Grisso's conclusions.3 67 Thus, like the Cook
County study of mental disorders among adolescents, 36 the numbers Grisso
reports may be under-inclusive.

358. GRISSO, supra note 243, at 193-94; Juveniles' Capacity,supra note 352, at 1160.
359. Juveniles' Capacity,supra note 352, at 1166.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 1165.
362. Id.at 1166.
363. See Steven A. Greenburg, Learning DisabledJuveniles and Miranda Rights-What
Constitutes Voluntary, Knowing, & Intelligent Waiver, 21 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 487, 490
(1991).
364. Id. at 504.
365. Id. at 490.
366. Id. at 503.
367. The same may be true of those who are developmentally delayed due to childhood
physical or sexual abuse, substance abuse, or other traumas. See Beyer, supra note 334, at 26
(discussing developmental delay). Beyer's study noted that twelve out of seventeen delinquent
youth exhibited signs of developmental delay, which she describes as "comparatively mature
thinking or moral reasoning combined with emotional childishness." Id. at 35. Although Beyer's
study did not correlate developmental delay with the inability to comprehend Miranda rights
found among twelve of the seventeen youth, further research might show such a relationship. In
that event, Grisso's conclusions perhaps would be even more startling.
368. See supra note 349 and accompanying text.
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The findings of Grisso and other developmental psychologists regarding
juveniles' limited ability to reason and make good judgments are
uncontroverted. Many juvenile courts, however, have continued to ignore
the message in those findings, as the cases analyzed in Part III demonstrate.
V.

RECONSIDERING JUVENILE WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL

A. The Inadequacyof the JudicialRemedy for Invalid
Waiver of Right to Counsel
As reported in Part III, eighty percent of the reported waiver cases were
reversed on appeal based on the reviewing court's determination that the
waivers were invalid. Although none ofthe cases explained the legal basis
for reversal ofthe delinquency adjudications, federal cases involving invalid
adult waivers of right to counsel have articulated the legal principles
underlying their decisions. Those cases establish that when a court accepts
a defendant's waiver of counsel without establishing that it was knowing,
voluntary and intelligent, the court effectively denies the defendant his right
to counsel. 69 Moreover, right to counsel is so essential to a fair trial that
deprivation of the right constitutes a constitutional error that can never be
deemed harmless."' 0 Rather, a substantive violation of the right to counsel
gives rise to structural error which so undermines the integrity of the trial
automatic reversal without a showing of prejudice
process that it requires
37'
defendant.
to the

369. E.g., Henderson v. Frank, 155 F.3d 159, 169 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that the defendant
was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the court accepted an invalid waiver
of counsel at suppression hearing); United States v. Balough, 820 F.2d 1485, 1489-90 (9th Cir.
1987) (noting defendant's waiver of right to counsel at the hearing on his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea was not knowing and intelligent and constituted an unconstitutional denial of his right
to counsel).
370. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-30 (1993) ("existence of [structural]
defects-deprivation of the right to counsel, for example-requires automatic reversal of the
conviction because they infect the entire trial process"); Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 (1988)
("right to counsel is 'so basic to a fair trial that [its] infraction can never be treated as harmless
error' (alteration in original)); see also Bruce A. McGovern, Invalid Waivers of Counsel As
Harmless Errors:JudicialEconomy or a Return to Betts v. Brady?, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 431,
443 (1987) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 & n.8 (1967)) (noting certain
constitutional rights, such as right to counsel, are so basic to a fair trial, that their denial is error
that can never be harmless); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) ("[a]ctual or
constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in
prejudice"); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489 (1978) ("when a defendant is deprived of
the presence and assistance of his attorney... reversal is automatic").
371. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (stating that atotal deprivation of right
to counsel required reversal); see also McGovern, supra note 370, at 451 ("[h]armless-error
analysis ...presupposes a trial, at which the defendant, represented by counsel, may present
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Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the question
whether an invalid waiver of right to counsel constitutes a structural defect
requiring automatic reversal, nearly all of the federal courts of appeals that
have considered the question have ruled that a trial judge's failure to assure
that a waiver of right to counsel is valid requires automatic reversal of the
defendant's conviction. For example, in Hendersonv. Frank;7 the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the district court's acceptance of the
defendant's invalid waiver of right to counsel at his suppression hearing was
a structural defect defying harmless error analysis and requiring reversal
without a showing of prejudice.373 The court of appeals reasoned that the
defendant "lost much more than [the] opportunity to have his confession
suppressed" when he was deprived of his right to counsel; that deprivation
"may have had repercussions in plea bargaining, discovery and trial strategy
that would not be cured by a new suppression hearing alone."374 The only
remedy for a defect that had so infected the entire trial process, the court
concluded, was automatic reversal of the defendant's conviction.375
The same analysis must govern juvenile waiver cases. For juveniles, as
for adults, right to counsel is the key to their ability to receive a fair trial
that accords them their due process rights. When the juvenile court permits
ajuvenile to waive right to counsel without establishing that the waiver was
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, the juvenile is deprived of his right to

evidence and argument before an impartial judge or jury" (alteration in original) (citing Rose v.
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986)). Cf Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) ("giving of a
constitutionally deficient reasonable-doubt instruction . . . requir[ed] reversal); Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 302 (1986) (finding admission of coerced confession required
reversal); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (finding trial by a biased judge required
reversal).
372. 155 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 1998).
373. Id. at 170.
374. Id. at 169-70.
375. Id. at 171. Accord French v. Jones, 282 F.3d 893, 902 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding
defendant's invalid waiver ofcounsel during the court's supplemental instructions was a structural
defect requiring reversal); United States v. Stubbs, 281 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that
the trial court's failure to establish that defendant's waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent
could not be subjected to harmless error analysis); United States v. Cash, 47 F.3d 1083, 1089-90
(I th Cir. 1995) (stating the same, in the context of a defendant with documented mental
problems that brought into question his ability to make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
waiver); United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577, 1580 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding trial court's
complete failure to conduct a pretrial inquiry into defendant's waiver when defendant appeared
without counsel rendered his purported waiver invalid and because it left him "entirely without
the assistance of counsel" could not constitute harmless error); United States v. Balough, 820 F.2d
1485, 1490 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding defendant's waiver of right to counsel at the hearing on his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea was invalid and was a denial of his right to counsel, which
required automatic reversal). But see Richardson v. Lucas, 741 F.2d 753, 757 (5th Cir. 1984)
(applying harmless error rule to uphold conviction, despite finding that defendant's waiver of right
to counsel was invalid).
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counsel. That deprivation so contaminates the entire trial process that it can
never constitute harmless error. Instead, as in adult waiver cases, the
juvenile court's acceptance of an invalid waiver is a structural error that
requires automatic reversal without a showing of prejudice.
However, correction at the appellate level provides faint hope for most
juveniles who waive their right to counsel."76 The sheer enormity of the
problem is reflected in the low appeal rate for juvenile adjudications and
dispositions. A 1996 study by the ABA Juvenile Justice Center found that
the practice of taking appeals in juvenile court is "lacking in most
' Nearly one-halfofjuvenile public defenders and more than
jurisdictions."377
three quarters of appointed lawyers authorized to file appeals reported that
they had taken no appeals in the preceding year.378 Add to those numbers
the one-third of public defenders and one-quarter ofappointed lawyers who
were not authorized to appeal,379 and the prospects for review of ajuvenile
court's decision are dim, even for those who were provided counsel in the
first instance. For all those who waived their right to counsel, the
opportunities are rare indeed. Relying on the wisdom of the appellate courts
to remedy the injustice visited upon youth by the juvenile court's
acquiescence in invalid waivers of right to counsel, therefore, is an
inadequate remedy for such a significant problem.
B. The Need to GuaranteeThat Every ChildHas Counsel
Eighty ofthe ninety-nine reported juvenile waiver cases discussed above
were reversed on appeal. To be sure, each reversal was based on the
appellate court's determination that the child's waiver of right to counsel
was invalid, not on areview ofthe merits ofthe delinquency adjudication.380
But in the absence of counsel, few cases are determined on the merits.
Instead, most of the accused juveniles simply plead to the charges as
brought.381 Without counsel,juveniles do not have even the benefit ofa plea
negotiation, much less a full blown evidentiary hearing. Those few who go
to trial without counsel are no match for the powers of the State, which
never appears in court, even juvenile court, without legal representation.
Even in a case involving only misdemeanor charges, having a lawyer can
make the difference between an adjudication of delinquency and dismissal

376. Juveniles have no appeal of right as a constitutional matter. Gaultrefused to address the
issue, stating only that the Court had never held that the Constitution requires the states to provide
a right to appellate review. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 58 (1967).
377. Patricia Puritz & Wendy Shang, Juvenile Indigent Defense: Crisis and Solutions, 15
CRIM. JUST. 22, 23 (Spring 2000).
378. Id. (noting 46% of public defenders and 79% of appointed lawyers).
379. Id.
380. See infraAppendices A & B.
381. See infraAppendices A & B.
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of the charges. The first case that came into the Boyd School of Law
Juvenile Justice Clinic dramatically illustrates the impact of legal
representation. The clinic client was one of three twelve-year-olds who
were charged with damaging the complainant's trailer by pushing it into a
ravine. Two of the boys waived their right to counsel and admitted the
charges. There was no way to refute that what had started off as a joy ride
had concluded with the trailer damaged and at the bottom of a deep ravine.
Upon acceptance of the two boys' pleas, the juvenile hearing master
adjudicated them delinquent and placed them on probation. The third boy
asked for a lawyer and was referred to the law school clinic. After minimal
investigation, the student lawyer assigned to represent the boy discovered
that the complainant did not even own the trailer; the boy's father did, and
he had no interest in pressing charges. The state's attorney willingly
dropped the charges upon receiving proof of ownership, and the court
dismissed the petition. Two boys with delinquency records, one without,
and the difference was the legal representation.382
The patent inequity in the outcomes for the three boys undermines both
the authority of the juvenile court and its rehabilitative aims. Whether a
child is adjudicated delinquent should not hinge on the child or his parent's
independent knowledge of the importance of counsel. It is the court's
responsibility to guard against the kind of inequity that occurred in this
case. As the cases discussed in Part III demonstrated with painful clarity,
the juvenile courts do not uniformly provide the protections required by
law. An external limitation on juvenile courts' discretion, in the form of
either legislative enactment or court rule, is essential to preserve juveniles'
right to counsel and the fundamental guarantees of due process.
One proposal, which criminal justice experts have long called for, is
automatic appointment of counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In
1967, the National Report of the President's Crime Commission
recommended that, to achieve procedurajustice for children, counsel must
be appointed "as a matter of course whenever coercive action is a
3 3
possibility, without requiringany affirmative choice by childorparent."
The Commission emphasized the importance of the right to counsel in
juvenile court proceedings and stated that "no single action holds more
potential for achieving procedural justice for the child in the juvenile court

382. The student attorney was elated at the outcome for her client, but could not help being
troubled about the unfairness to the other boys. If our client was entitled to a lawyer, so were they.
The difference was not that our client was so much wiser than the other boys, but that his father
knew from prior experience with the client's older brother in juvenile court to tell him to ask for
a lawyer, whereas the other boys did not receive that advice from anyone.
383. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 38 n.65 (1967) (emphasis added) (quoting PRESIDENT'S CRIME
COM'N NAT'L CRIME COMM'N REP. 86-87 (1967)).
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than provision of counsel.""3 The Commission considered the presence of
legal counsel the "keystone of the whole structure of guarantees that a
minimum system of procedural justice requires."3 '
The Commission acknowledged fears that lawyers would makejuvenile
court proceedings more adversarial and even defeat the therapeutic aims of
the court,3 86 but did not agree with the naysayers. History had not shown
any necessary connection between the informality ofthe traditional juvenile
court and its treatment goals, nor did the Commission view the relative
formality which lawyers would bring to the proceedings as inconsistent with
the court's therapeutic mission." 7 The Commission even suggested the
possibility that lawyers, "for all their commitment to formality, could do
more to further therapy for their38 8clients than can small, overworked social
[services] staffs of the courts.
At least three states reflect the Commission's recommendation and
require, by statute,38 9 court rule,390 or case law,39 ' that juveniles be provided
counsel before permitting a waiver of their right to counsel, and other
jurisdictions follow the same practice, even though not required by law.392
Additionally, in spring 2001, an ABA task force issued a white paper which
concluded that no youth being tried as an adult should be permitted to
waive the right to counsel without consultation with a lawyer and without

384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. See id.
388. Id.
389. N.Y. Family Ct. Act 29-a; see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.23 (West 1984) (accepting no
waiver by anyone under fifteen; no out-of-home placement unless child had assistance of counsel).
Note that a complete analysis of the waiver provisions of state statutes was beyond the scope of
this Article.
390. NEW MEX. R. ANN. CHILD. CT. R. 10-205 (2001); see also In re D.S.S., 506 N.W.2d
650, 653-54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (noting the juvenile court rule requiring court or counsel who
is not the county attorney to advise juvenile regarding right to counsel).
391. State exrel. J.M. v. Taylor, 276 S.E.2d 199, 202-04 (W. Va. 1981).
392. A story related by psychologist and juvenile justice researcher Thomas Grisso is a
particularly poignant example of such voluntary practices. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Consentin
Delinquency Proceedings, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE
JUSTICE 131, 146 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000). Grisso had heard of a court
in a small Tennessee town which was reputed to be a model ofjuvenile justice, and decided to pay
the town a visit. Once there, Grisso learned that the local practice was to have a member of the
court's youth services staff (oftwo) explain the right to counsel and other rights and then quiz the
juvenile about his understanding of the rights. If the juvenile indicated that he understood, the
court worker would refer the boy to a defense lawyer and tell him that he could not waive his right
to counsel until he had talked with the lawyer. Only if the child returned with a form signed by
the lawyer acknowledging that the child had consulted him would the child be permitted to waive
his right to counsel. When Grisso commented that this went way beyond what Tennessee law
required, the response was, "We think it's fair." Id.
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a full inquiry into the youth's understanding of the right and the ability to
make the waiver decision intelligently, voluntarily and understandingly.393
In the rare case in which a waiver might occur, the task force urged that
standby counsel always be appointed.394
Others have gone a step further and advocated the need for a
nonwaivable juvenile right to counsel. In 1980, ajoint commission of the
Institute for Judicial Administration and the American Bar Association
(IJA-ABA) completed a comprehensive re-examination ofthe premises on
which juvenile right to counsel and waiver were based.3 95 The IJA-ABA
concluded that minors can never validly waive their right to counsel39 6 and
adopted standards which declare that "[a] juvenile's right to counsel may
not be waived" either pretrial or in a subsequent adjudication proceeding.397
Brenda Flicker, one of the principal participants in the Juvenile Justice
Standards Project, has written elsewhere that "[p]roviding accusedjuveniles
with a nonwaivable right-to-counsel is probably the most fundamental ofthe
'
hundreds of standards in juvenile justice."398

393. See Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Juvenile Justice: Task Force Report for Practitioners,
Policymakers, 16 CRIM. JUST. 66, 66-67 (Spring 2001) (citing A.B.A. Task Force, Youth in the
CriminalJustice System: Guidelinesfor Policymakers and Practitioners(2001)). This Article's
proposed prohibition on waiver injuvenile court is not inconsistent with the ABA's recommended
consultation-before-waiver rule in adult court. Although the waiver prohibition could, and perhaps
should, be extended to adult court, this Article focuses specifically on the problems endemic to
the juvenile court system, where judges have unbridled discretion and delinquency adjudication
has traditionally been viewed as inconsequential, at least in the long term.
394. Id. at 67.
395. I.J.A. & A.B.A., JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS (hereinafter IJA-ABA STANDARDS),
STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS (1980).
396. Id. Standard 5.1, Commentary (1980).
397. Id. Standard 6.1(A) (1980) ("[a] juvenile's right to counsel may not be waived," even
though other rights may be waived in particular circumstances); IJA-ABA STANDARDS,
STANDARDS RELATING TO ADJUDICATION, Standard 1.2 & Commentary (1980) (explaining that
standard insisting that "court should not begin adjudication proceedings unless the respondent is
represented by an attorney who is present in court" means that "the right to counsel [is]
nonwaivable"). Working together, the IJA and ABA designed standards that would increase the
fairness ofjuvenile law by eliminating "inconsistencies in ajuvenile's rights and liabilities that
are caused by the accident of geography." BARBARA D. FLICKER, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE
JUSTICE: A SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 3-4 (1977); see also MANFREDI, supra note 40, at 161-62.
398. BRENDA FLICKER, PROVIDING COUNSEL FORACCUSEDJUVENILES i (1983). The IJA-ABA
Standards for Juvenile Justice emphasize the significance of the role ofthe lawyer, stating that the
activities in which a lawyer must engage on behalf of a client
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At least two states have followed the lead of the IJA-ABA and made
juvenile right to counsel nonwaivable.399 Professor Barry Feld has similarly
advocated the automatic and nonwaivable appointment of counsel at the
earliest possible stage of delinquency proceedings."' Feld bases his
argument for nonwaivable counsel on the adversarial nature of juvenile
court proceedings after Gault.4"' in support of that argument, he states:
"[I]n an adversarial process, only lawyers can effectively invoke the
procedural safeguards that are the right of every citizen, including children,
as a condition precedent to unsolicited state intervention."4 2
These recommendations reflect a recognition of the fact that juveniles
are different from adults in ways which suggest that juveniles need
protections not accorded adults. Children and adolescents are
developmentally different from adults, and those developmental differences
need to be taken into account at all stages and in all aspects of the justice
system, and most particularly, in the provision of counsel. Automatic
appointment ofcounsel, without an affirmative request for a lawyer, would
go a long way toward compensating for the disabilities of youth. However,
because neither thejuvenile court's track record in advising juveniles ofthe
right to counsel norjuveniles' attempted waiver of counsel assure that any
waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, the only way to assure
juvenile access to counsel and the full protections of due process is to

require a sense of professional responsibility to the client, the skill to present the
client's position in legal and administrative forums, and the ability both to
investigate that which seems good for the client and to distinguish the attorney's
opinion from the position that the client is entitled by law to take. These, among
others, are functions for which lawyers are or should be specially qualified and
which, as experience has amply demonstrated, are not readily assumed by other
available representatives for juvenile court clientele.
I.J.A. & A.B.A STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES, Standard
1.1, Commentary (1980).
399. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.11(2) (West 2002); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.10(b)
(2002).
400. EmpiricalStudy, supra note 203, at 1326-29.
401. Id. at 1327-28.
402. Id. at 1328.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

61

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 1
638

FLORIDA L4AW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

prohibit juvenile waiver ofright to counsel.4 3 Ajuvenile waiver prohibition
will both survive constitutional scrutiny and establish sound public policy.
C. The ConstitutionalViability of a ProhibitionAgainst Waiver
A juvenile waiver prohibition will have to overcome Faretta v.
California,4 4 to establish its constitutionality. In Faretta,the United States
Supreme Court declared that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
"necessarily implies the right to self-representation, ' 405 and held that
"forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right
to defend himself.4 6 The question, then, is whether juveniles have a right
to self representation equivalent to that announced for adults in Faretta.Put
another way, would a prohibition againstjuvenile waiver offight to counsel
unconstitutionally deny juveniles their "right" to exercise waiver? As the
following analysis shows, the answer is "No," because juveniles can claim
no such right.
In Faretta, the Court found the right of self representation in the
language of the Sixth Amendment, which grants to the defendant, not his
counsel, the right to be "informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, ... confronted with the witnesses against him," and "accorded
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."4 7 Even the right
to counsel provision, the Court noted, speaks of the "assistance of
counsel," making the defendant the master of his own defense.408 The trial
record established that Faretta was "literate, competent, and understanding"

403. Some commentators may disagree with this conclusion. See generally Rhonda Gay
Hartman,AdolescentAutonomy ClarifyinganAgeless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265(2000)
(advocating a shift in thinking about adolescence that approaches adolescent behavior from the
standpoint of decisional competence). Hartman argues that the time has come to "establish
explicitly what the law has been embracing implicitly-adolescent decisional ability." Id. at 1359.
Although Hartman advocates decisional autonomy in the juvenile delinquency setting as well as
in various civil law-'ontexts, she presumes the presence of counsel in delinquency proceedings.
See id. at 1297-98. This presumption of juvenile representation is reflected in Hartman's
conclusion that "[florthright recognition of decisional capability, coupled with attention to
constitutional safeguards and effective legal representation for adolescent defendants, would
enhance fairness and uniformity, yet provide defense counsel the opportunity to proffer mitigating
evidence, such as diminished capacity, when appropriate." Id. at 1301. Cf Beschle, supra note
311. Beschle does not decide in favor of or against a consistent approach to laws governing
juvenile autonomy. He argues, instead, that both sides of the debate about the future of the
juvenile justice system should consider the possibility that support for autonomy in a wide range
of civil contexts clashes with a continued commitment to a paternalistic, rehabilitative response
to juvenile crime. Id.at 66.
404. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
405. Id. at 832.
406. Id. at817.
407. Id. at 819 (quotation marks omitted).
408. Id. at 820 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss4/1

62

Berkheiser: The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile
JUVENILE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

and "voluntarily exercising his informed free will" when he "clearly and
unequivocally declared to the trial judge that he wanted to represent
himself," even after the judge had warned Faretta that he was making a
mistake." 9 Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge's
requirement that appointed counsel conduct Faretta's defense denied
Faretta his Sixth Amendment right to conduct his own defense.410
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the
constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults."' 4"
The rationale traditionally cited for this inequality is factually based on "the
peculiar vulnerability of children; [and] their inability to make critical
decisions in an informed, mature manner."'"2 However, there is a purely
legal basis for the distinction as well. The constitutional source for
juveniles' right to counsel is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,4" 3 not the Sixth Amendment. The Faretta right of self
representation is based on the express language of the Sixth Amendment,
language which does not appear in the Fourteenth Amendment.414
Moreover, a nonwaivability rule is consistent with Gault and its
progeny. Gault recognized juvenile right to counsel not because it was a
right specifically guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, as was the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,415 but because right to
counsel was essential to the due process required of all court
proceedings. 1 6 The Gault Court rejected an approach in which juvenile
rights would mirror those of adult defendants and grounded juveniles' rights
on due process. 417 That substantive choice focused future decision makers
on the protections necessary to make juvenile delinquency proceedings
fundamentally fair, not on what the law required for adults.418 Considering
the data reported in Part III, continued recognition of a juvenile "right" to
waiver of counsel is so fundamentally unfair that juveniles who waive
409. Id. at 835.
410. Id. at 835-36.
411. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (plurality opinion) (discussing abortion

rights of pregnant minor).
412. Id. Typically, courts have used juveniles' vulnerability and immaturity to justify
diminished recognition of constitutional rights, in such areas as privacy, see PlannedParenthood
of Central Missouriv. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) (discussing abortion rights of pregnant
minor), and procedural due process, see Parhamv. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603-04 (1979) (discussing

parents' right to commit their children to mental institutions "voluntarily").
413. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
414. See generally Faretta,422 U.S. 806. See also U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV.
415. See supranotes 83, 90.
416. See supra Part II.E.
417. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
418. See supranotes 98-117 and accompanying text (discussing post-Gault Supreme Court
decisions, which both expanded and limited recognition of juvenile rights, based on the Court's
assessment of due process and fairness implications).
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counsel are systematically denied due process. Not only do juveniles have
no Farettaright to represent themselves, 419 the courts have a responsibility
to institute measures that will assure the fundamental fairness ofjuvenile
proceedings. Thus, a prohibition against waiver will withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
D. The PublicPolicy Implicationsof a NonwaivabilityRule
1. Collateral Benefits of Providing a Lawyer to Every Child
Society too has an interest in assuring that the trial process is fair and in
keeping with the commands of due process. Juvenile waiver of right to
counsel impairs the fairness of delinquency proceedings because lawyers are
themselves the means of securing a fair trial and maintaining due process
throughout the proceedings. Moreover, courts which freely permit juveniles
to waive their right to counsel undermine their own "institutional interest
in the rendition ofjust verdicts."42 Due process guarantees every juvenile
facing a delinquency adjudication a fundamental, absolute right to a fair
trial,4 2 ' just as it does adult criminal defendants.422 "Where, for one reason

419. See Robert E. Shepard, Jr., Juveniles' Waiver of the Right to Counsel, 13 CRIM. JUST.
38 (Spring 1998) (noting the commentary to Standard 1.2 of the IJA-ABA Standards Relating to
Adjudication, which distinguishes Farettaforjuveniles based on the different constitutional bases
for juvenile and adult right to counsel). The commentary states that the standard also draws
support for its conclusion from the Supreme Court's holding in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,403
U.S. 528 (1971), that "the [S]ixth [A]mendment right of trial by jury is not applicable in state
juvenile proceedings," because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the
Sixth Amendment, governs those proceedings. I.J.A. & A.B.A.STANDARDS, JUVENILE JUSTICE
STANDARDS RELATING TO ADJUDICATION, Standard 1.2, Commentary (1980). The Supreme Court
further confirmed the correctness of this analysis when it declined in one of its first decisions of
the twenty-first century, to extend the Farettaright to appeals. Martinez v. California, 528 U.S.
152, 163 (2000). In Martinez, the Court held that criminal defendants have no constitutional right
to waive counsel and represent themselves on appeal. The Court adverted to the Sixth Amendment
and its specification of the basic rights of the accused in "all criminal prosecutions." Id. at 159-60
(quotation marks omitted). Because a defendant's appeal occurs after the prosecution has
concluded, the Court held that any right to self-representation on appeal could not arise from the
Sixth Amendment, but would have to derive from the Due Process Clause and its guarantee of
fundamental fairness. Id. at 161. The Court did not believe, however, that the right to represent
oneself is essential to a fundamentally fair appellate procedure, and so it rejected the defendant's
claim. Id.
420. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160, 164 (1988) (refusing criminal defendant's
waiver of defense lawyer's conflict of interest and recognizing that individual Sixth Amendment
rights are subordinate to society's interest in assuring fair trials).
421. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
422. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 683 (1984); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554,
563-64 (1967); In re Murchison et al., 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955), cited in United States v. Farhad,
190 F.3d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir. 1999) (Reinhardt, J., concurring specially), cert. denied2000 WL
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or another, the proceedings fall short of the standard the Constitution
imposes, and a defendant does not receive a fair trial, he is deprived of due
process of law." ' Thus, it is "not only the defendant who 'suffers the
consequences' when a fair trial is denied, but the justice system itself. Put
another way, the state has a compelling interest, related to its own political
legitimacy, in ensuring both fair procedures and reliable outcomes in
criminal trials ...."' The same reasoning applies to juveniles facing
delinquency adjudication and possible confinement to ajuvenile institution.
Juvenile courts that sacrifice right to counsel for judicial expediency
unduly jeopardize both the accused juvenile's rights and their own and the
public's interest in a fair trial. The state has no legitimate interest4 .5 in the
perpetuation of procedures which place juveniles' substantial liberty
interests at risk of deprivation when those same procedures violate the most
basic right of all Americans accused of criminal acts to a fair trial. To the
contrary, the state has a paramount interest in ensuring a fair system of
juvenilejustice,426 just as thejuvenile defendant has a paramount interest in
minimizing the risk of an unwarranted loss of his liberty.

286750 (March 20,2000).
423. Farhad,190 F.3d at 1105 (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring specially) (urging the United States
Supreme Court to "reconsider Farettaand the line of cases implementing it").
424. Id at 1107 (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring specially).
425. Some would argue that the state has legitimate interests, including fiscal and
administrative considerations, particularly in rural areas where resources may be limited, in
maintaining the status quo. The short answer to those arguments, however, is that fiscal and
administrative concerns cannot override constitutional rights and the effective implementation of
procedures necessary to assure that those rights are not impinged upon. Since Gault, all courts
have been required to offer counsel to juveniles in delinquency proceedings, and that simply is not
happening in some places, although many jurisdictions have been able to implement Gault
effectively and provide counsel to every juvenile in delinquency proceedings. The author has had
conversations with lawyers in Phoenix, Arizona, and in Washoe County (Reno), Nevada, as well
as with clinical law professors in many otherjurisdictions, where provision of counsel to juveniles
is automatic and has been for some time. In addition, during the course of writing this article, the
author and her clinic students were able to improve the Nevada statute regarding juvenile waiver
(though not to prohibit it, unfortunately, yet). The result of the change is that all juveniles facing
felony charges in Clark County (Las Vegas), Nevada are automatically referred to counsel at the
plea hearing. In the past, juveniles were not given counsel until after the entry of plea, with the
result that many admitted the charges and were adjudicated delinquent without ever talking with
a lawyer.
426. Though of less significance than the interests discussed in the text, the state also has a
fiscal interest in assuring that only guilty juveniles are committed to state custody. The costs of
unwarranted institutionalization are both immediate, in terms of the day to day expenses of
institutional care, and permanent, in terms of the drain on state resources brought about by
incarceration's proven tendency to create lifelong criminals who accomplish nothing productive
and keep returning to the state's care. See Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 313, at 200 (making
similar comments in the context of institutionalization of developmentally disabled children).
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Mandatory appointment of counsel also may overcome the sometimes
prejudicial effects of selective appointment of counsel. Although a 1970
study showed that providing counsel to juveniles resulted in fewer
dismissals and commitments to juvenile institutions,427 later research
reported the opposite result in connection with dispositions. 428 Represented
juveniles often received more severe treatment than those who were not
represented. 29 Juvenile court judges' resistance to and even resentment of,
defense lawyers may explain the latter result.4 10 However, if all children
receive representation by counsel,judges will no longer be able to penalize
those who appear before them with counsel, for to do so would mean
penalizing everyone. As bad as some juvenile courts are, they are unlikely
to divorce themselves completely from the rehabilitative aims ofthejuvenile
court. If some judges remain recalcitrant, voters and appointing bodies will
have to exercise their will and refuse to retain them.
Moreover, the benefits of providing counsel to every child extend to
both the accused child and the entire juvenilejustice system. The IJA-ABA
Juvenile Justice Standards Project recognized this mutuality of benefits in
Section 1.1 of its standards for counsel for private parties.43 ' Section 1.1
states: "The participation of counsel on behalf of all parties subject to
juvenile and family court proceedings is essential to the administration of
justice and to the fair and accurate resolution of issues at all stages of those
43 The commentary to section 1.1 emphasizes the importance
proceedings.""
of counsel to the integrity of the process: "In addition to providing critical
assistance in the conduct of a specific proceeding, the presence of counsel
contributes significantly to the integrity of the judicial system and to its
perceived433legitimacy for those who come before it and for the public in
general.1

In sum, the automatic appointment of nonwaivable counsel furthers the
interests of everyone: thejuvenile facing delinquency charges, the juvenile
court, the juvenile justice system, and the public at large.
The analysis here would be incomplete, however, if it did not address the
concerns of some that a per se rule of nonwaivability would contradict
important principles of developmental psychology,juvenile justice, and due
process.434 One commentator has cited the Supreme Court's adoption of
427.
428.
429.
430.

Ferster et al., supranote 191, at 402.
Feld, supra note 5, at 227.
Id.
See supra notes 189-203 and accompanying text.
431. .J.A. & A.B.A. STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATEPARTIES,
§ 1.1 (1980).
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. See, e.g., In re Manuel R., 543 A.2d 719, 723 (Conn. 1988) (rejecting arguments for a
per se rule of nonwaivability so as to allow a "child to make an informed and deliberate choice
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due process as the constitutional basis for juvenile rights to buttress her
arguments in favor of adolescent autonomy, stating "the Court reminds us
of the law's intrinsic respect for the dignity of persons, whether children,
adolescents, or adults. Though not explicitly addressed by the Court,
implicit in its rulings affording constitutional rights to adolescents is the
corollary ability to exercise or waive those rights ... ."" Moreover, studies
have shown that youthful offenders are more likely to respond positively to
court intervention when they are active participants in the process than
when the process is simply imposed upon them.436 Social scientists have
further observed that
[w]hen young people are helped to take responsibility for their
actions in programs designed to foster positive development
in the way they think, how they define themselves in their
families and with peers, their view of right and wrong, and
their recovery from abuse, they are unlikely to be dangerous
once they become adults.437
These principles form the basis for opposition to a prohibition against
juvenile waiver of right to counsel.
Such an all-or-nothing approach, however, is not essential to gain the
benefits ofjuveniles' participation in thejudicial process. Franklin Zimring
has described adolescence as a "learner's permit" for adulthood,43 ' and has
said that in our society, "part ofthe process ofbecoming mature is learning
to make independent decisions."439 Taking Zimring's analogy one step
further, the requirement that ajuvenile appear in court only with a licensed
lawyer is equivalent to the learner's permit requirement that an underage
driver always be accompanied by a licensed adult driver. Even after
appointment of counsel, the judicial system affords juveniles many
opportunities to make independent choices in keeping with the "learner's
permit" of adolescence.

about legal representation"); Hartman, supranote 403, at 1298 (advocating adolescent autonomy
in decision making).
435. Hartman, supra note 403, at 1282.
436. E.g., Richard Barnum &Thomas Grisso, Competence to Stand Trial in Juvenile Court
in Massachusetts: Issues of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 321, 326 (1994); see also Manuel R., 543 A.2d at 723 (basing rejection ofaper
se rule of nonwaivability on concerns that such a rule "might actually frustrate a principal goal of
juvenile law of encouraging children to accept responsibility for their transgressions and take an

active role in their rehabilitation").
437. Beyer, supra note 334, at 35; see also Hartman, supra note 403, at 1268 ("individual
autonomy fosters self-determination and self-confidence by cultivating an important sense of
responsibility and accountability, not only to oneself but to others").
438. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 89-90 (1982).

439. Id.at 91.
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Under Rule 1.14 of the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility,44 °
even when a lawyer is representing a minor whose "ability to make
adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation is
impaired [by his youth]," the lawyer still is required "as far as possible, [to]
maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client." 44 1Model Rule
1.2 explains the decisionmaking parameters of such a "normal" relationship:
A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation ...and shall consult with the
client as to the means by which they are to be pursued ....
In
a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision,
after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered,
whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will
testify.442
The same ethical constraints apply injuvenile delinquency proceedings.
The National Advisory Commission for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention has stated unambiguously that the principal duty of a lawyer
representing a juvenile is "to represent zealously [the client's] legitimate
interests. Determination of the client's interests under the law should
ordinarily remain the responsibility of the client. '443 Similarly, Martin
Guggenheim has written: "Lawyers representing children in [delinquency]
proceedings, like lawyers representing adults in criminal proceedings, are
ethically obligated to seek the objectives as defined by their clients, whether
or not [they] think those objectives are sound for the client or for
society." 4 " As these commentaries make clear, the ethical rules governing
lawyers require that a juvenile client retain substantial decisional control,
exercised in consultation with his lawyer, over important aspects of the
representation.
Thus, mandating representation by counsel does not deny juveniles the
opportunity to exercise their individual autonomy. As clients, juveniles
maintain the ability to actively participate in the judicial process and to
accept personal responsibility for their decisions concerning, inter alia,
440. Most states have adopted the Rules in substantial part. See A.B.A. & BUREAU OFNAT'L
AFFAIRS, LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, LMPC 1:11 (1998) (documenting

variations from the Model Rules in each state except Maine, Nebraska, and Ohio; and counting
only ten states with substantial differences: Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii,
Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia).
441. A.B.A., ANNOTATED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.14(a) (2000).
442. Id. Rule 1.2(a).
443. Id. (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE &
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 3.134

(1980)).
444. Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigmfor Determiningthe Role ofCounselfor Children,64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1424 (1996).
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whether to accept a plea and waive the right to a trial and whether to testify
at trial. The only decision that is taken out of their hands by the proposed
prohibition is whether to waive right to counsel. Given the studies of
juvenile courts' implementation of Gault and the results of the case law
research conducted for this Article, continued reliance on juvenile court
judges to conduct waiver proceedings that give due attention to the
particular needs ofjuveniles is not sound public policy. Instead, prohibiting
waiver and assuring that every child facing delinquency charges injuvenile
court has the assistance of counsel will provide the due process that is
lacking in many juvenile courts today. Taking this one bold step also should
help restore confidence in a juvenile justice system that many believe has
lost its way." 5
2. Collateral Consequences of Invalid Waivers
In addition to the general benefits to society and the juvenile justice
system addressed above, a nonwaivable right to counsel will protect
juveniles from the increasingly severe and punitive consequences of a
delinquency adjudication. Recall that in the cases analyzed in Part III, more
than three-quarters of the juveniles whose waivers were overturned had
been committed to state custody. As alarming as that rate of wrongful
incarceration is, it is just one of the risks borne by a juvenile who is
adjudicated delinquent after waiving counsel.

445. See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining ChildhoodandReconstructuringthe Legal
Order: The Casefor Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1083, 1083-85 (1991)
(arguing that society's current view of adolescence so differs from turn-of-the-century views that
dominated creation of juvenile justice system that juvenile court should be abolished, and
contending that juveniles will receive better protections of their rights in adult court); Barry C.
Feld, Symposium on the Future of the Juvenile Court, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness,
CriminalResponsibility, andSentencing Policy,88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 134 (1997)
(proposing abolition of criminal delinquency jurisdiction of juvenile courts and recognition of
youthfulness as mitigating factor in criminal sentencing, and arguing that "attempts to combine
criminal social control and social welfare goals" are doomed to fail). But see, e.g., Thomas F.
Geraghty, Symposium on the Future of the Juvenile Court, Justicefor Children:How Do We Get
There?," 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 190, 191 (1997) (arguing that "juvenile court and...
justice system.., should be retained after beirig reinvigorated with both financial and human
resources"); Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile
Court Abolitionists, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 163, 185 (responding to Professor Feld's abolitionist
argument, and while agreeing with much that he says, departing from him on abolition ofjuvenile
court, believing that trial in adult court is even worse and that because of certain juvenile court
benefits that adult courts are not likely to replicate, "[w]e should build on [our] strengths rather
than abandon ship").
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a. Sentence Enhancement
It has become commonplace in recent years for criminal courts to use
delinquency adjudications to enhance the sentence for an adult conviction,
even in a capital case. 446 All fifty states permit such sentence enhancement
in one form or another," 7 despite the fact that statutes in forty-five states
specifically provide that a juvenile adjudication is not equivalent to a
criminal "conviction";" 8 a delinquent child is not to be deemed a
"criminal"; 449 and neither the disposition of a child nor evidence presented
in juvenile court is admissible as evidence against the child in any other
court.450 Courts generally have gotten around such provisions by construing
the statutes to be inapplicable to adult sentencing decisions.4"'
Like state statutes, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines count "juvenile
offenses" as sentencing enhancements to the same extent as adult
convictions. 4" The Guidelines assign the same number of points tojuvenile
and adult sentences.45 3 Moreover, although the Guidelines limit the number
of points that may be assigned for prior adult offenses, they place no limit
on the points ascribable to juvenile offenses. The Guidelines' treatment
ofjuvenile offenses is troubling on a number of levels. First, the juvenile
justice system, in contrast to the criminal law, is founded on rehabilitative
principles and, even today, is designed to maintain the primacy of
rehabilitation and treatment in juvenile disposition decisions. 55 Second,
because a juvenile adjudication was never meant to carry the weight of a
criminal conviction, juvenile courts do not afford juveniles the full
procedural protections available to adults in criminal court. The broad
discretion of the judge, the unavailability of a jury trial, and the system's

446. Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Second-Class Justice, First-Class Punishment: The Use of
Juvenile Records in Sentencing Adults, 81 JUDICATURE 206,209-10 (1998). Sanborn reports that
only North Carolina provides for the use ofjuvenile records in capital punishment cases by statute,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(2) (2001), while fourteen other states allow it pursuant to court
decisions. Snborn, Jr., 81 JUDICATURE at 210.
447. Id. at 209.
448. Id. at 207.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id. at 207-08.
452. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(d) (2001).
453. Id. §§ 4A1.1, 4A1.2(d).

454. Id. §§ 4AI.1, 4Al.2(d).
455. See, e.g., Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., What of the Future?Envisioningan Effective Juvenile
Court, 15 CRIM. JUST., 6, 7 (2000); Jeffrey A. Butts, Can We Do Without Juvenile Justice?, 15

CRIM. JUST. 50, 51 (2000); Irene Merker Rosenberg, Teen Violence and the Juvenile Courts: A
Pleafor Reflection and Restraint,37 HOUS. L. REV. 75, 76-79 (2000) (cautioning against letting
headlines reporting teen violence drive juvenile justice policy and advocating maintenance of
treatment approach to juvenile crime as more effective than punitive approaches).
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rehabilitative aims make it much more likely that a juvenile will be
'
incarcerated than his adult counterpart, "for his own good."456
The effect of sentence enhancement provisions is that one set of rules is
applied to a juvenile's actions during her minority and another set to that
same past conduct once she attains adulthood. This is the essence of
unfairness. Given the heightened sensitivity to unfairness that is a normal
coincident of adolescence,4" 7 the philosophical disconnect reflected in
juvenile sentence enhancement provisions is no mere abstraction. Its
deleterious effects are real and are felt most by those who have the least
ability to protect themselves. A system which permits such demonstrable
unfairness must assure, at the very least, that the underlying delinquency
determination is a product of procedures which carefully guard the
individual's due process rights.
b. Treatment of Juveniles as Adults
The collateral consequences ofa delinquency adjudication go far beyond
their use in state and federal adult sentence enhancement. For example,
delinquency adjudications may affect a juvenile's continuing status as a
juvenile for any subsequent offenses.4"' About one-half of the states now
specify by statute that a prior delinquency adjudication may lead to transfer
to adult court, either through exclusion of the juvenile from juvenile court
jurisdiction or the prosecutor's direct filing of charges against the juvenile
in criminal court. 5 9 A majority of the states also follow the philosophy,
"once an adult, always an adult," meaning that ajuvenile once tried as an
of his age and the nature
adult will always be treated as an adult, regardless
460
wrongdoing.
of
allegations
future
of any
In addition, almost all states now permit fingerprinting and
photographing of juveniles, at least for investigative purposes, 46' and a

456. See David Dormont, Note, For the Good of the Adult: An Examination of the
Constitutionalityof Using PriorJuvenile Adjudications to Enhance Adult Sentences, 75 MINN.
L. REV. 1769, 1779-81 (1991).
457. Beyer, supra note 334, at 33.
458. See Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., CollateralConsequencesofJuvenile Proceedings:PartI,
15 CRIM. JUST. 59, 59 (Summer 2000) (hereinafter Collateral Consequences I); Robert E.
Shepherd, Jr., CollateralConsequences ofJuvenile Proceedings:Part II, 15 CRIM. JUST. 41, 41
(Fall 2000) (hereinafter CollateralConsequences If).
459. Collateral Consequences I supra note 458, at 59 (citing PATRICK GRIFFIN, ET AL.
TRYING JUVENILES As ADULTS IN CRIMINAL COURT: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER

PROVISIONS 14(1998)). See generallyRandieP.Ullman, Note, FederalJuvenile Waiver Practices:
A ContextualApproachto the ConsiderationofPriorDelinquencyRecords,68 FORDHAML. REV.
1329 (2000).
460. CollateralConsequencesI,supra note 458, at 59 (quotation marks omitted).
461. Ia1at 60 (citing HOWARDN. SNYDER &MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND
VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 101).
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growing number of states now require transfer of those records to a central
repository in which many do not require segregation ofjuvenile and adult
records.462 The upshot of these provisions, as with sentencing enhancement,
is thatjuveniles enter thejuvenilejustice system under procedures designed
for juvenile court and exit as constructive adults without the benefit of all
the procedural protections accorded adults in criminal proceedings.
c. Long-term Consequences
Equally troubling are a number oflong-term consequences that can arise
from a single delinquency adjudication. First, juvenile delinquency
adjudications are considered criminal offenses for purposes of military
service and can be disqualifying.463 For example, in the Army, an individual
is absolutely disqualified from service if he or she has been convicted of
either domestic violence against a spouse or family member, two felonies,
or one felony and two misdemeanors. 4" At first blush, the Army's policy of
refusing enlistment to felons and perpetrators ofdomestic violence appears
commendable. The problem, however, is that conduct similar to the shoving
of the group home worker described in the opening vignette of this Article
is charged as an act of domestic violence in some jurisdictions.465 If the
juvenile admits to the charge, as most unrepresented children do, his later
service in the Army, and perhaps other branches of the military, is
foreclosed. The felony exclusions are equally problematic. Without counsel,
many youth admit to crimes which appear innocuous but are charged as
felonies. A single petition may contain two felony charges or one felony and
two related misdemeanors, all arising out ofsimple possession ofmarijuana
and two items of paraphernalia. A fifteen-year-old who waives his right to
counsel and admits the charges is prevented from ever serving in the United
States Army, whereas his counterpart who is represented by counsel likely
will obtain the benefit of a non-felony plea bargain.
Second, a delinquency record can limit one's opportunities to attend
college and obtain employment. As noted above, most juvenile codes
provide that an adjudication of delinquency is not a criminal conviction.
Those provisions enable college and job applicants with juvenile histories
to respond in the negative to questions asking whether they have ever been
convicted of a crime.466 However, employers and educational institutions
increasingly include questions concerning an applicant'sjuvenile court and

462.
463.
464.
465.
466.

Id.
CollateralConsequences II supra note 458, at 41-42.
Id. (citing Army Regulation 601-210, ch. 4, paras. 4-20 through 4-23).
Clark County, Nevada is one of those jurisdictions, and I suspect it is not alone.
CollateralConsequences II, supra note 458, at 42.
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arrest records.467 It is difficult to envision that the answers to those
questions serve any purpose other than to assist decision makers in deciding
whom to admit or hire and whom to reject. Thus, ajuvenile record can limit
one's freedom to lead a productive life well after one has become an adult.
Third,juveniles who are resident aliens can suffer consequences to their
immigration status. Although juvenile delinquency adjudications are not
criminal "convictions" with negative immigration consequences,468 a
juvenile's conviction as an adult in criminal court meets the law's
requirement.46 9 Thus, a maj or consequence of the transfer ofa resident alien
youth to adult court is exposure to the likelihood of deportation, depending
on the "gravity of the offense charged [and] the nature of the sentence
47
imposed.""
Without a lawyer, fewjuveniles will understand that what appears to be
a minor juvenile offense can impact their lives in the ways described here.
Just as Gault considered the deprivation of liberty attendant to incarceration
in ajuvenile institution a potential denial of due process,47 the law's more
recent expansion of the negative consequences of a delinquency
adjudication implicates due process considerations. Given the continued
resistance of the juvenile courts in some jurisdictions to providing counsel
to juveniles, as evidenced by the studies and cases discussed in Part III
above, the limited ability ofjuveniles to make good decisions concerning
such complex matters as whether to waive right to counsel, and the
consequences of a delinquency adjudication as a result ofan invalid waiver,
due process must be seen to require automatic nonwaivable appointment of
counsel for juveniles.
VI. CONCLUSION

The history ofjuvenile justice in the United States explains, at least in
part, why juveniles' right to counsel has encountered such problems in the
juvenile courts. The broad discretion granted to juvenile court judges by the
court's founders and later by state statutes, coupled with the informality of
juvenile court proceedings, have impeded the full recognition ofjuveniles'
constitutional rights. Gault and its progeny have, for the most part,
constrained the juvenile courts' "worst of both worlds" treatment of
juveniles in delinquency proceedings, by focusing on due process and
recognizing rights wherever they are essential to the fundamental fairness
467. Id
468. Id. at 41 (citing In re Ramirez-Rivero, 18 I. & N. Dec. 135, 135 (B.I.A. 1981); In re
C.M., 5 I. & N. Dec. 327, 327 (B.I.A. 1953)).
469. Id. (citing Morasch v. INS, 363 F.2d 30, 31 (9th Cir. 1966); C.M., 5 I. & N. Dec. at

327)).
470. Id.
471. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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of the juvenile justice system. By adopting the due process approach, the
Supreme Court set the stage for recognition of rights and protections for
juveniles that are not extended to adults, for the very reason that in order
for juveniles to obtain access to due process, they may need more
protection than adults.
Waiver of right to counsel is one area in which juveniles should receive
added protections based on the particular vulnerabilities of childhood and
youth and the failings of the juvenile court. Juveniles do not have the
capacity for sound decision making or an understanding of the significance
ofright to counsel and the consequences of waiving the right. Because they
lack a clear understanding of the right to counsel, they are denied that most
fundamental constitutional right without knowing they have any recourse.
Appeal is an inadequate remedy both because few juvenile lawyers, either
public or private, file appeals on behalf oftheir clients, and without counsel,
few juveniles know they have a statutory appeal right. Moreover, juvenile
courts have not been inclined to expend the time and effort necessary to
conduct appropriate and thorough waiver colloquies with juveniles. As a
result, some jurisdictions have decided that the better course is to
automatically provide counsel to all juveniles. By eliminating waiver
proceedings, courts can devote more attention to the merits of the
delinquency petition and the proper disposition for the juvenile in the event
of an adjudication of delinquency.
Making right to counsel nonwaivable by juveniles in delinquency
proceedings will assure that they receive counsel in the first instance. With
counsel, juveniles stand a chance of prevailing in what must be viewed as
an adversarial system ofjuvenilejustice. Without counsel,juveniles' rights
will continue to be ignored and trampled in the crush of heavy caseloads
and the state's demand for juvenile accountability.
A proper procedure is no panacea, of course. It is not just the fact, but
the quality, of representation that will determine the effectiveness of any
changes in the functioning of the juvenile court system. To effect real
change requires a commitment to investing the resources necessary to
developing a well-trained cadre of lawyers who specialize in juvenile
representation. Only then will the juvenile court system begin to realize its
promise.
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